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Sommaire
Peu nombreux sont ceux qui auraient envisagé que l’Allemagne
retrouverait au XXe siècle une place au sein des grandes puissances.
Pourtant, suite à la chute du mur de Berlin et la fin de la Guerre froide,
l’Allemagne devint la première puissance économique et politique de la
Communauté européenne. C’est ainsi que la «question allemande»
ressurgit en Europe, les pays de la Communauté européenne s’inquiétant
du nouveau rôle que ce pays puissant allait jouer au sein de la
Communauté. L’Allemagne devait donc rassurer ses voisins à l’Ouest,
mais ne pouvait, en même temps, ignorer les pays résurgents de l’Europe
de l’Est, se trouvant ainsi dans une situation précaire.
Beaucoup allaient étudier cette nouvelle Allemagne, laissant
autant les leaders politiques que les intellectuels et les journalistes inquiets,
voir même méfiants, par rapport à la place de l’Allemagne réuni en
Europe. Partant de ce constat, ce travail visera donc à étudier la perception
médiatique de l’évolution de la politique européenne allemande. L’objectif
ultime est donc d’analyser comment un périodique percevait les
changements qui transformaient l’Allemagne et l’Europe, tout en
cherchant à voir si l’Allemagne parvint à surmonter ce défi, convaincant
ses voisins qu’elle est redevenue un pays ordinaire et bienveillant. Comme
source de base, cette étude s’appuiera sur The Economist, périodique
iv
britannique de renommée mondiale. En analysant les articles écrits entre
1989 et 1999 et en les comparant aux écrits érudits de la même époque,
nous découvrirons un nouvel angle sur cette période et sur ce pays qui
provoqua tant de soucis au début des années 1990. Ce travail jettera donc
une nouvelle lumière sur la position de l?Allemagne en Europe et nous
montrera comment elle fut perçue par un des journaux les plus influents de
la décennie 1990.
Mot clés: Allemagne, politiques européennes, Union européenne,
réunification allemande, périodiques, The Economist.
VAbstract
There were few who would have predictedthat Germany would,
in the span of the twentieth century, once again find itself a place among
the great European powers. Aftcr the fali of the Berlin Wall however, and
the end of the Cold War, Germany was on the road to becoming the
strongest power in the European Community both on the economical and
political level. It is thus that the ‘German Question’ came once again to the
fore as the leaders of the European Comrnunity worried about the role
which this new power would play in their midst. Germany therefore had to
appease its Western neighbours by promoting deeper integration of the
European Union, but could not, at the same time, ignore the rising and
unstable democracies on its Eastern borders. Germany thus found itself in
a rather uncertain situation, leaving world leaders, scholars, and journalists
to wonder what the new Germany might bring.
Among those studying Germany’s new predicament in Europe,
the media played an important role, influencing the way in which Germany
was perceived by both leaders and individuals alike. The main goal of this
thesis is to analyse how a periodical perceived the transformations that
both Germany and Europe were undergoing, and at the same time to try
and sec whether Germany managed to overcome the challenge of proving
vi
to its neighbours that it had become a normal and benign country. This
thesis will study the perception of Germany’s role within the European
Union from the point of view of a prominent British periodical with a
broad international readership, The Economist. Thé Economist, whose
political analyses rank high among its competitors, brings a new twist on
Gennany and its European policies, quite different than the main scholarly
texts of the day. With its sharp and witty style of writing, The Econornist
closely covered Germany’s evolution in Europe and allows us to see how
its 0flOfl of Germany evolved over time. This study will thus bring
fonvard a never-before studied aspect of Germany’s place in Europe, and
will shed light on the way in which Germany was viewed by one of the
more important journals ofthe 1990s.
Key words: Germany, European politics, European Union, German
unification, periodicals, The Economist.
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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
1. An Overview of the Dissertation
I. Germany’s Predicament following Its Unification
The Cold War ended differently than one might have expected.
There was littie fanfare or explosions as the walls of Communism tumbled
like dominoes in front ofa Soviet Union that no longer seemed to care. On the
contrary, the war ended peacefully, as conferences and speeches replaced the
expected flare-ups and hostilities. Despite this extemal calmness, the
European political order of over forty years was growing unstable, leaving
politicians and world leaders uncertain of what lay ahead. With the first
breach in the Berlin Wall, talks of a reunited Germany began to appear as an
almost attainable goal and for the first time since the end of the Second World
War, Europe was once again faced with the prospect of German
predominance. A united Germany had the possibiÏity of becoming, with the
help of its strong economy, a European superpower. Re-emergence of a united
Germany in the heart of Europe thus rekindled a “host of half-repressed fears
and concems”1, leaving more than one political leader apprehensive of what
Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price, Enlarging NATO and the EU, ManchesterfNew York,Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 1.
7this new Germany rnight bring. Although Gerrnany remained enclosed w
ithin
the European Commtinity (EC), no one could be certain of the direction that
this rising power might take. The “German Question” retumed once again
onto the political arena, as Germany becarne the abject of many contradictory
wonies, both rational and uTational, about its future role in a Europe no longer
divided by an iran curtain.2
The Federal Republic of Gerrnany has been known to be one of
the strongest promoters of the EC since its foundation in 195$. However,
with the reunification of Germany there arose a tension between Germany
and the other members of the EC. Whule the unification of a divided people
may bave seemed a good objective in itseÏf, the reunification of Germany
would bring ta Europe what Europe feared most: a strong Germany. few
would have imagined that Germany would, once again in this turbulent 2Oth
century, find itselfa place among the world’s powers. However, by 1991 the
“new” Gennany’s population reached nearly $0 million, thus a third larger
than any ofthe other three largest states ofthe EC: Great Britain, france and
Itaiy.3 Moreover, Germany had Europe’s Iargest economy, a strong currency
and a gross national product one and a haif times higher than that of Great
Britain, one third higher than those of france and ItaÏy.4 It would flot take
2 Ibidem
Spence, David. “The European Comrnunity and German Unification”, ftorn federaÏism,
Unfication anct European Integration, Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm, ed. London
and
Portland, OR, frank Cass, 1993, p. 136.
‘ Tirnothy Garton Ash, In Europe ‘s Naine. Germaity and the Divided Continent, New
York,
RandomHouse, 1993, p. 382.
3much, with these statistics, for Germany to lose the description that W
illy
Brandt had ascribed to Germany, that of an “econornic giant but a pol
itical
dwarf’ and to become a “giant” on both counts.5
Thus, a united Germany found itself in an entirely new situation.
The European dynamics were altered, and the “German Question” became
again central. There were wonies about the impact of reunification on
several levels. for example, what influence would sixteen million people
who had known over sixty years of dictatorship have on a democratic,
though perhaps no ‘onger staNe, Western Germany?6 Some predicted a
revival of the old Geiman desire for hegemony in Europe, while others
feared that the Soviet Union’s price for reunification would mean that
Germany, or rather, the two Germanys, respectively withdraw from the
Warsaw Pact and NATO, thus creating a united Germany that would be both
neutral and unpredictable.7
Anxieties such as these were not rare, but on the contrary,
continued to rise as France and Great Britain became increasingly
apprehensive of the renaissance of this enlarged Germany. They feared a
new German domination, and regarded reunification worriedly. In this
manner, Gennany now found itself in a new and complex situation that was
Spence, David. op. cil., p.136.
Ibidem
Ibidem
4charged with historical connotations- a position which put Germany in a
rather shaky equilibrium.
While the events ofthe early 1990s seemed’relative1y cairn on the
surface, considering the widespread changes that were transforming the
shape of Europe, the reservations that held back Western leaders ran deep.
These fears were flot taken lightly, in view of the important measures that
the EC would undertake in order to counteract this newly increased German
power. Moreover, the political and economic space of Europe was quickly
shifting eastwards. The EC couid no less igTlore this fact than openly
acknowledge its fear of a rising German power. With these two factors in
mmd, the EC had to balance a double-sided political agenda — that of a
deeper integration within the Community, with the idea of enciosing
Germany more tightly within it, and that of a greater expansion towards
Central and Eastern Europe. It could flot, however, choose one over the
other, as both factors played strongly on European politics, and couÏd hardly
5e ignored.
Germany, in the meantime, was flot oblivious to the concems
mounting ail over Europe. Indeed, if many were to study this new “German
Question”, it was studied no less, if not more, by the Germans thernselves.
They too, were uncertain cf the way an increase in power might affect
German politics in the future, and were, for the most part, more than eager
5to remain bound within a more integrated Europe. In addition, Germany
bordered a number of ex-Communist states, and its interest in keeping
stability in the East was more than evident. Enlargement, for Germany,
seemed the key solution to maintaining peace and order on its Eastern front.
Germany’s position toward enlargement and deeper integration was that one
could flot exist without the other. More than any other European state,
Germany wanted to balance these two political agendas. The politicians in
Bonn saw these as the only two possibilities of action: a choice had to be
made between further integration within the EC and a more open position
towards Eastern Europe. These politicians had then to try and do the
impossible- manage, within the EC, a simultaneous policy of both
integration and enlargement. In their viewpoint, this was the only way to
secure Germany a place in a stronger and deeper Europe.
II. A Menacing Germauy?
Apprehensions and sensitivities conceming Germany have
existed since the late l9th century. Throughout this time, Germany found
itself at a point of convergence of European interests, with its geographic
location and economic potential playing an essential role, as well as its
territory and its population, which were the largest in Europe (with the
exception of Russia, which was also the object of some suspicion
throughout the 2Oth century). Without necessarily meaning to, Germany
6reflected a disquieting, sometimes menacing, image. Napoleon III had said
in 1868, preceding Bismarck’s first unification ofGermany:
“It may be very well to say that Germany is not an aggressive Power, but
tvho can say when she may not become so? And that she may not some day
seek to unite within her boundaries the Russian-German provinces of the
B altic s? ‘ ‘
This concern, expressed at the end of the l9th century, is flot bereft of a
certain validity. It could even be said that Napoleon III had enounced a
somewhat prophetic vision. Germany had, after ail, known more than its
share of belligerence and expansionist visions during the 2Oth century. It
would be unjust, however, to interpret Germany and its history with only
somber visions and depictions.
Siiice the end of the Second World War, West Germany has
wanted but one thing- an ever deepening integration in the West.
Nonetheless it was not easy for other European countries to remain neutral
before Germany, especially if its remarkabÏe economic growth was to be
taken into account. Germany, for its part, did everything to be accepted as
an equal among the other European nations. According to the journalist
David Marsh, Germany abstained from any national poÏicy for forty years,
or rather, its national policy was, almost without interruption (if one is to
take into consideration Willy Brandt’s OstpoÏitik that of assuring North
8 David Marsh, Gerrnany and Europe. The crisis of Unity, London, Mandarin, 1995 [1994],
p. 127.
7America and the rest of Western Europe that its national interest did flot
differ from theirs.9
Thus, for four decades, West Europen countries came to
appreciate having a divided Germany, economically strong yet politically
obedient, within their exclusive club. Talks of German unification, however,
woke dormant fears among West European countries, leaving Germany in a
delicate position. According to Timothy Garton Ash, director of European
Studies at Oxford, “whatever the evolution of German power in the 1990s,
the united country would remain an awkward size in an awkward place.
Germany now had precisely that ‘critical size’ to which Chancellor
Kiesinger had referred back in 1967: ‘too big to play no role in the balance
of forces, too small to keep the forces around it in balance by itself”10. The
end of the Cold War and German reunification disrupted the status quo that
had been more or less achieved following the Second World War. What role
would a united Germany now have to play?
III. Preseutation of the Thesis
The European states and their leaders were at the core of the EC.
As a resuit, they would also play an important role in mapping out Europe’s
future. Their fears and ambitions were craftily worded so as to make the
9lbidem.,p. 129.
‘° Garton Ash, op. cit., p. 384.
8good of Europe seem their primary concem. However, flot only presidents
and prime ministers took part in this game of opposing and converging
interests. Joumals, magazines, and newspapers showed certain political
positions and a consistent interest in what was happenihg to this new Europe
as weÏl. These, along with other mass media, may have affected the way that
citizens in Europe and abroad viewed the events happening on the
Continent. Thus, the importance of periodicals cannot be underestimated,
nor their political views and analyses understated.
Indeed, according te several leading analysts in communication
and media studies:
“Newspapers appear regularly and frequently, in uniform format. Also, they
have a more or less explicit point of view. The press is mainly an information
medium rather than an entertainment medium; and the most significant
category on which the press regularly presents news and views is the
political, including the ideological.... The press is both accessible and rich in
the vocabulary of political ideology current among the dite of any given
time...”
This citation explains that periodicals too, engage in political
thought, and, it should 5e pointed out, on a scale much more greater than
most scholarly work. In comparison, joumals
- certainly those highly
Wayne A. Danielson and Dominic L. Lasorsa, “Perceptions cf Social Change: 100 Years
of Front-Page Content in the New York limes and The Les Angeles limes,” in Cari W.Roberts, Text Analysis for the Social Sciences: Method for Drawing Statistical Inferencesfrom Texts and Transcrtpts, Mahwah, NJ, Lawrence Eribaum Associations, 1997, p. 104.
9regarded by the political dites- enjoy a far larger spectrum of influence,
having the capacity and the means to transmit their message in an age when
mass media plays a preponderant role in everyday life.
Thus, in viewing Germany’s new and evolving place in Europe, I
found it interesting to compare how leading journals covered this event.
However, broadening the scope of a Masters thesis to include analyses of
several journals would have resulted in a rather superficial study. Therefore,
in trying to present Germany’s situation in Europe after its reunification, this
dissertation will address the significance of onejoumal’s political viewpoint
and compare it to the perception of this question in scholarly literature.
From a broad selection of periodicals, this dissertation viÏl focus on one
specific magazine, The Econornist (the reason for this choice wiÏÏ be
explained further on in the introduction). With two distinctive aspects, the
scholarÏy accounts of the evolution of Germany’s position in Europe, on the
one hand, and its media coverage, on the other, this dissertation will present
points of convergence and divergence between the two. This study will span
the breadth of l7ie Economist articles published from 1989 to 1999, trying to
determine its editorial policy, or at least find a continuum in its political
analysis. In this manner, it will try to understand the way in which The
Economist covered German unification and Germany’s evolving place in
Europe.
10
0f ail the institutions and organisations in contemporary Europe,
the European Union (EU) is beyond doubt the most important, having
fundamentally transformed the dynamics of the European order.’2 My
interest in contemporary European history, and more secifica1Iy, in German
history, led me to a subject so far more explored by political scientists,
sociologists and economists than by historians: the contemporary history of
the EU. Relations among Western European countries reversed entirely in
less than a century, going from two world wars to an ever tightening
economic and political union. In studying contemporary European history it
is no longer possible to ignore the impact of the EU, whose role is
increasingly feit in day-to-day European politics. My interest in this
institution overlapped with my interest in Germany, another political entity
whose dimensions and political aspirations have changed drastically in the
span ofa century.
Much lias been written on Germany ever since its unification. If
Germany has fascinated historians and political scientists throughout the
2Oth century, it remains no less tnie in present day. A plethora of books and
articles studying Germany, its economy, its role in Europe and in the
international sphere, its defence, its role in the wars in Yugoslavia, etc., are
published yearly. A careful selection lias therefore to be made in order to
have a balanced and comprehensive view of Germany’s role in Europe in
the 1990s.
12 Hyde-Price, op.cit., p. 174.
11
In the research that has been undertaken for this project, several
texts written by prominent historians ami political scientists have been u
sed.
Timothy Garton Ash pubhshed a comprehensive survey of Germany’s ro
le
in Europe since World War II, whule Adrian Hyde-Price did a wide-rangin
g
study of the enlargement of the EU.13 Heiming Tewes, Harald Millier, and
Barbara Lippert present clear analyses of the integration versus enlargernent
debate in Germany.14 David Spence, editor of the financial Tirnes, studied
some issues posed for the EC by German unification.’5 These are the
principal, though by no means oniy, sources used in this research project.
Another kind of study was done by Ruth Dudley Edwards: a history of The
Econonzist. 16
Despite the passage of time since the Second World War, in
studying Gerniany at the beginning of the 2lst century one must stiil deal
with abundant prejudices and presumptions. Indeed, the judgements of more
than one historian or political scientist have been clouded by biased
sentiment toward Gerrnany, be it in overly positive or overly negative a
light. Adrian Hyde-Price, professor of Politics and International Relations at
‘ Garton Ash, op. cit.; Hyde-Price, op.cit.
Henning Tewes, “Between Deepening and Widening: Role Conflict in Germany
’s Enlargernent Policy”,
Western European Politics, vol. 21 (April 1998).; Harald Mûller, “German foreign Pohcy after
Unification”, from The New Germaity and the New Europe, Paul 3. Stares, ed. Wash
ington DC., The
Brookings Institution, 1992.; Barbara Lippert, et al. British anci German Interes
t in EUEnlargment:
ConJlict and Cooperation, London, Continuum, 2001.
15 Spence, op. cil.
Ruth Dudley Edwards, The Pursitit ofReason: 111e Economist, 1843-1993. L
ondonl New York. Hamish
Hamilton, Penguin Books USA, 1993.
12
the University of Leicester, explains this trend by reducing it to
two main
dangers involved in studying Germany in Europe. It is easy, on the on
e
hand, to lapse into an exaggeration of German power and its ability to
influence and determine events in Europe. On the other hand, Hyde-Pric
e
continues, it is important to keep in mmd that Germany is not just another
state in Europe.’7 Though sometimes perceived as such by contemporary
scholars, Gennany is flot a superpower, nor does it use the EU to serve its
own purposes. Its people are flot overridden by ‘angst, aggressiveness
,
assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality’, as
they were described by Margaret Thatcher’s private secretary Charles
Poweli in March 1990.18 They are, to quote Richard von Weiszacker,
president of Germany between 1984 to 1994, a ‘pretty normal people, just
like everyone else.”9 This does flot mean that German policy is not to be
judged nor critiqued. Even if one abstains from overly praising or criticizing
Gennany, one must keep in mmd that Germany is a country with a troubled
past, and one that has enougli economic strength and political power to
substantially shape the turn of events not only in Central and Eastern
Europe, but in the rest of Western Europe as well.
17 Ibidem., p. 3.
18 Ibidem (these were national characteristics ascribed to the Germans in the confidential
Whitehall memorandum drawn up by prime rninister Thatcher’s private secre
tary Charles
Poweil after an informai seminar at Chequers on Sunday, 24 march 1990 ).
‘ Ibidem (citing Weizscker, R. von (1991) Guif War Not a Sign of Things to Corne’,
Gennan C’omments, 9:22 (April) p. 7.)
13
Keeping a balanced view on Germany has flot aiways proved
easy, certainly flot in the immediate years following its unification.
Historians and politicians alike were tom about the future of Germany, flot
without reason, for Germany was a major cause of th’e two greatest wars in
Europe in Iess than a century. Since the tum of the 2Oth century and with
new issues on the political agenda, such as the war aganst terrorism and a
war in Iraq, anxieties conceming Germany have diminished as has the
perceived threat by Russia to the West. Yet many of the sources that are
used for the purposes of this project were written in the early 1990s, when
debates about Germany were both more involved and more heated. Thus, an
analysis of two kinds of writing on Gemiany and European integration
—
scholarly accounts and those published in The Economist
- should provide a
baÏanced view ofthe course of Germany’s development.
IV. Outiine of the Dissertation and the Sources Used
Before explaining the manner in which this study will be
conducted and the methods that will be used, it is important to explain why
this essay covers the dates between 1989 and 1999. This time frame vas
chosen with the purpose of underlining the evolution of our problem during
a crucial time period which will 5e presented in the following chapter.
14
Indeed, it was a decade of uncertainty, when the bipolar world,
by then familiar, even comfortable, for much of Europe, collapsed. What
emerged was an uncertain balance of powers, the United States taking the
lead, with European countries needing to redefine themselves for the first
time in over fifty years. This change of the political order, in Europe and in
the rest of the world, is a crucial period in history and it is only now, with a
littie more hindsight, that we are able to understand these events. Yet to
study this time period- in our case through the medium of The Econornist
meant also to study relatively recent articles. Appropriate measures had to
be undertaken, for it was important to remain distant from the articles, and
to weigh their standpoints appropriately.
Analysing magazine articles is a procedure that requires careful
judgement as it is easy to be swayed by the style and character of the
articles, especially when the number of articles read is high and spans
several consecutive years. With the help from the departments of
communication and journalism at the Université de Montréal and with
several reputable textbooks on quantitative and qualitative analysis,
appropriate methods to be used in analysing political periodicals were
established.
In order to understand the inner workings of this periodical, I
contacted the European editor of The Econornist, Xan Smiley, whose
15
thoughts wilI be presented in the conclusion. With these combined methods
ofanalysing The Economist’s political views, we will be able to compare the
approach of The Economist regarding Germany’s place in Europe to those of
historians and political scientists ofthe day.
As to the body ofthe dissertation itself, it will be divided into two
main sections, each of which will be separated into two parts. One section
will present a historical analysis of Gerrnany’s position in Europe, based on
scholarly work, while the second section will survey articles from The
Economist. An assessment of these articles will give the events being
studied a different twist. Comparisons between The Economist, history
books and other periodicals will be drawn, so that The Economist’s
viewpoint may be put into perspective. This study of The Economist’s
articles will Ïead the reader to understand the way in which this periodical
perceived Germany’s position in Europe between 1989 and 1999.
Thus, the first part of this thesis will explore how Germany dealt
with its unification, and how it perceived its role within Europe. It will give
a detailed account of German unification and its influence on European
politics. It will shed light on the events that led to the Treaty on the
European Union, more often referred to as the Maastricht Treaty. Among
other things, this treaty established the EU, gave the European Parliament
new powers, and laid down the procedures for creating Economic Monetary
16
Union.2° This part will focus on the importance that a greater European
integration held for Germany, as weÏl as on the monetary, economic, and
political questions with which Germany was confronted. Its stniggle for a
new identity is another issue that will be raised, and Germany’s positions
conceming greater influxes of immigration and American troops on German
land will be mentioned.
The second part vill span a longer period, ranging from the
Maastricht Treaty, past the Amsterdam Treaty, ending in 1999, as
preparations for the next Intergovemmental Conference were under way.
Yet this part will be shorter than the first, for the first part involves a more
difficuit period for Germany and for Europe, and requires explaining both
Germany’s and Europe’s role in greater detail. The second part, which
includes the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, is a much more stable
time period for Germany, its place in Europe less uncertain, and therefore as
long an elucidation of Germany’s European policies will flot be required.
Indeed, it is during this time period that Germany established itself once
again among the other European nations. The “Germany Question” no
longer brought about the same doubts and fears that it did before the
Maastricht Treaty. Preparations for the accession ofnew members in the EU
were under way. It is at this juncture that Germany understood that
enlargement was becoming a reality and that it would corne sooner than
John Pinder, The European Union. A Veiy Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2001, p. 191.
17
later, and feit that an even deeper integration was necessary. Thus, Germany
occupied itself with promoting reforms inside each European institution,
without which enlargement would produce nothing more than a diluted
community. Consequently, Germany’s focus on enlargement became less
important, and other concems took over instead: the Common Agricultural
PoÏicy for example, and social issues, such as the European Charter of
fundamental Human Rights.2’
The above is an overview of the first section of the dissertation.
The second section of the dissertation will explain how The Economist, a
privileged observer, related to what was going on in Gerrnany and in
Europe. This section’s timeframes correlate closely to those in the first
section. The first part will extend from the reunification of Gemiany until
1994, and the second part will continue from 1994 until 1999. A comparison
will thus be drawn between reality as perceived by contemporary political
scientists and historians, and that perceived by The Econornist. Yet before
studying what The Economist has to add to our historical analysis of this
decade, it is important to understand who The Economist writes for, the
perception that The Econoinist lias of itself, and the mariner in which The
Economist is written.
21 Pinder, op. cit., p. 58.
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2. The Econornist
I. What is Tite Ecoiiornist?
The Econornist has a circulation of over 900 000 readers per
week.22 Four issues are printed each month, totalling fifty-one joumals per
year, with a double issue at the end of December. Each issue covers the
main economic and political news of the past week, offering in-depth
analysis of several of these events. The magazine belongs to a select group
of highly regarded j oumals throughout the world.
This “newspaper” as it likes to cali itself is published in six
countries and is available in most ofthe world’s main cities and in over two
hundred countries.23 Founded in 1843 with the specific purpose of
campaigning on the important political issues of the day, The Economist
was, and has remained, a promoter of classical liberal ideas. A believer in
free markets and free trade, The Econornist has, throughout the l9th and
2Oth centuries, been a strong promoter of internationalism and minimum
interference by govemment, especially in market affairs.24 In a phrase
coined by a previous editor, Geoffrey Crowther, The Economist represents
22 John f. Jungclaussen, “Liberal bis in die letzte Zeile”, Die Zeit, 26 February 2004, p. 27.23 Ibidem
24 Economist.Com, About tue Economist, [on-une]
http://www.econornist.cotn’help/DisplavHetp.cfm?fotder=663377 (page consuÏted on
December 12 2002).
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the “extreme centre,” a role it has aimed to maintain throughout its history.2
Though The Econornist has certainly voiced a somewhat conservative
opinion, it lias not been predictable or constant in its political views. For
example, The Econornist backed the more conse-vative parties under
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan when they were in power, and
supported the Americans both in Vietnam and in the most recent war in Iraq,
yet also encouraged many of Biil Clinton’s polities and endorsed several
liberal clauses such as gun control and gay marnage.
An interesting element in The Economist’s writings is that it is
entirely written in one voice, and discord is rarely, if ever, found in its
pages. Moreover, the articles are anonymous, unless it is an article written
by an invited specialist to analyze a specific topic. Yet, while the articles are
mostly unsigned, some eminent people have contributed to the pages of The
Economist such as Herbert Henry Asquith and Garret Fitzgerald, future
British and Irish prime ministers, Luigi Einaudi, future president of Italy and
Kim Philby, a key Soviet spy.26
There is a reason for which The Econornist writers are to remain
anonymous: while many hands write The Econornist, “it speaks with a
collective voice”.27 In fact, ail the articles in The Economist are written in
one style, and it is hard indeed to teil one writer from another. The
25 Jungclaussen, op.cit., p. 27.26 About the Economist, op.cit.
27 Ibidem., p. 2.
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journalists gather weekly to discuss and dispute the issues that they are to
cover; and some articles get heavily edited if they faïl out of une. Moreover,
according to The Econornist, “what is written is more important than who
writes it”,28 and the editor sees himself as “the servant of something far
greater than himself.”29
Although The Econornist began as a British journal, in order to
survive The Econornist ‘s readership became increasingly international,
today largely centred in the United States. At present, forty six percent of its
sales are in North America, twenty one percent in Continental Europe,
seventeen percent in the United Kingdom, eleven percent in Asia and the
Pacific region, three percent in the Middle East and in Africa, and two
percent in Latin America.3°
As early as the 1840s, The Econornist could find readers in
Continental Europe and the United States. The Economist began by covering
mostly British politics and finance, but slowly broadened its scope to
Europe. The American focus became increasingly important as The
Econornist tried to give its British readers a better understanding of the
United States. following the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941,
The Economist began to reserve an entire section for the United States,
28 Ibidem
29lbidem., p3.
30Economist.Com, Advertising Info. Circulation,
[on-une], http:Hads.econornist.coinlprint/circulation.htrn (page consulted on December 12
2002).
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called “American Survey”. Over time, more sections have been added to
The Economist, devoting weekly articles to Africa and Asia, and later Latin
America and Canada. The Econoinist had to continue catering to its readers,
who, increasingly, became interested in, and were more affected by, politics
ami finance beyond their borders.31
The Economist is written for an audience of senior business,
political and financial decision-makers who, according to The Econornist,
“value [the magazine for the] accuracy of its incisive writing ami lack of
partisanship.”32 The Economist caters to readers drawn largely from
business and political elites, the average income of its readers exceeding 154
000 US dollars.33 The magazine sees its purpose in supplying these people
with a correct and rapid analysis of world events, both of economic and
political nature, ail the while using simple language and carefuliy avoiding a
more cumbersome style that might be expected from an elite magazine
produced in Britain.34
This perhaps explains why The Econornist has a smaller
circulation than most international magazines. According to Van ity fair,
The Economist is “probably read by more presidents, prime ministers, and
About the Economist, op.cit.
32 Economist.Com, Advertising Info: Introduction
[on-une], http://ads.economist.com/printIindex.htrn(page consulted on December 13 2002).
Jungclaussen, op.cit., p. 27.
About the Econornist, op.cit.
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chief executives around the world than any other.
. .The positions it takes
change the minds that matter.”35
In a section of its website, called ‘Media Testimonials’, The
Econornist has excerpts, neediess to say ail positive, though by no means
unjustified, of what other journals have ritten about it. The New York
Times writes that The Economist is “one ofthe most respected magazines in
the world,”36 whule the Los Angeles Tirnes writes that The Econornist is “one
of the worid’s most influential news magazines.. .required reading among
movers and shakers from 10 Downing Street to the White House.”37
Newsweek states that reading The Economist is mandatory at the pinnacles
of power and that, in ail its years, the magazine “has cared iess about how
many readers it has than who those readers are.”38 And Time magazine
continues in a similar vein, saying that The Economist exerts “an influence
far beyond its circulation.”39 The International Herald Tribttne for its part
writes: “This unique journal in which sheer intellect, backed by integrity and
a bold weicoming of new ideas, bas held say over statesmen and
governments.”4° Among its prominent readers were Lord Granville, British
foreign secretary in the late 19th century, Woodrow Wilson, president ofthe
Economist.Com, Advertising Info: Media Testimonials, [on-une]
http://ads.econornist.com/printtestirnonial.htm (page consulted on December 14 2002).36 Ibidem
Ibidem
Ibidem
Ibidem
40 Ibidem
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United States from 1913 to 1921 and, more recently, Helmut Schmidt,
chancellor of West Germany from 1974 to 1982.41
li spite of its reputation, The Economist ha deser’ed few studies
focusing on its political analyses.42 This dissertation will offer one such
study, focusing on Germany and its reiinification, providing us with a
unique perspective and analysis of Germany’s evolving position in Europe.
Moreover, it will show flot only the situation in which Germany found itself,
but also the way Germany was seen from a British perspective, though
certainly flot aiways representing the perspective espoused by the British
govemments during this period.
The opinions of The Economist aiso matter in Germany.
According to the frankfurter Aligerneine, The Economist is uniquely
qualified to analyze German politics: “The Economist’s survey on West
Germany [combines] economic and current affairs in a way that no other
magazine of international reputation achieves... This endeavour succeeds
admirably well, both in the way the vast mass of materiai is sifted and
effortlessly mastered and in its acutely penetrating powers of observation.”43
A higher praise from a prominent German journal can hardly be imagined.
“ Ibidem
42 have searched ail the large university libraries for any studies written on The Econornist
and have flot found any. It may be possible, however, that similar studies have been done,
though perhaps flot in recent years.
‘ Advertising Info: Media Testimonials, op.cit., p. 1.
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Yet, as previously mentioned, the scarcity of sources about The
Econornist means that this chapter is largely based on information retrieved
from The Economist archives and web pages. While the magazine certainly
entertains a measure of seW-criticism, it seems likely that, as any other
magazine would, it must market itself and may therefore give an image of
itself that does flot correspond entirely to reality. Nevertheless, no evidence
bas been found to contradict the information found on The Economist web
pages and in its archives. What is more, an article about The Economist
published in Die Zeit44 gives a thorough account of the way The Economist
operates and its reputation worldwide, in no case contesting or contradicting
the information found on The Economist website.
Now that a clearer vision of what The Econornist is has been
drawn, we will take a few steps back to look at how scholarly work lias
studied Germany’s role in Europe before tackiing the actual purpose of this
dissertation: to examine whether The Econornist hoÏds any siants conceming
Germany, whether it focuses on one aspect of Germany’s position in Europe
more than on other aspects, whether the question of integration and
enlargement is important to The Econornist, and whether it brings any new
viewpoints into light. The study will try to discem the differences between
how The Economist analyses Germany in Europe throughout the 1990s and
how cunent political analysts and historians have viewed this development.
In doing so, a new and so far unexplored perspective on the evolution of
See Jungclaussen, op.cit.
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Germany within the EU will be exposed. There is much to gain from what a
magazine with, according to Der Spiegel, a “legendary influence,”45 has had
to say.
Ibidem
PART TWO:
110W DANGEROUS IS A REUNITED GER1MANY?
A SURVEY 0F GERMANY’S ROLE IN EUROPE FROM 1989 TO
1999
1. The First Haif of the 1990s
I. The Future of the EC: Enlargement versus Integration
Throughout its history, the EC has remained open to
enlargement. The name that the founding fathers gave the EC reflected an
aspiration, rather than a fact. Six states of Westein Europe, however
important their status, were certainly flot representative of the Continent,
and could hardly be called Europe.46 The aspiration vas, among most
European federalists, that this community would grow until its name would
become a reality.
Indeed, between the creation of the EC and the end of the Cold
War, most European nations that applied to join the EC were welcomed as
full members, with little or no delay. The notable exception was Great
Britain, whose membership had been delayed for political reasons both
within Great Britain and on the Continent. Many countries, however,
abstained from having any relations with the EC. What kept this rather large
Pinder, op.cit., p. 123.
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number of countries from appiying was the Cold War. Communist
govemments had their own form of economic union through COMECON,
whereas several non-communist states, such as Austria, f inland, Sweden
and Switzerland, abstained from membership, preferrig flot to compromise
their neutral status in the Cold War.47
Thus, with the fali of communism came a rise in requests for
membership in the EU.48 first to apply were the countries that, throughout
the Cold War, had decided upon neutraiity. Their applications accepted,
Austria, finland and Sweden became full members in 1995. During this
time, former communist regimes in Eastem Europe were slowly tuming into
newly democratic regimes and market economies. It was flot long before
they too, expressed their desire to join the EU, and by the mid-1990s, a
dozen countries had indicated their interest in adhering to the EU.49
The idea of expanding the EU was flot, however, appreciated by
ail Member States. Certain ambivalence existed among many countries
unsure if such an enlargement would favour the Union. Many feared that the
Eastem economies would prove to be incompatible with those of the West,
“in part because of their social legacies but also because they were less
Frank L. Wilson, European Politics Today. The Democratic Experience. 3rd edition,
Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1999 [1990], p. 409.
‘ The names European Community (EC) and European Union (EU) will at times be
interchanged, depending on the years being covered.
Wilson, op.cit., p. 409.
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developed, poorer, and more agricultural than the existing members.”5°
Moreover, these members clairned that cultural differences, such as those
between Orthodox Christianity and the Roman Catholic and Protestant
cultures, would corne in the way. The list ofreasons aainst expansion went
beyond the legacy of communism, particularly afier East Germany joining
the EU ‘through the back door’ had made Eastem expansion more real.
The issue of further expansion of the EU had been divisive since
the 1980s. With the possibility of opening eastwards, the debate over
deepening versus widening intensified. Deepeners reasoned that the EU
should develop doser ties within its existing members states before taking
on new rnernbers, whereas wideners rnaintained that mernbership shotild be
open to other states immediately.5’ The question of how large the Union
could and should become without losing its character or its potential for
political unity was of major importance for the deepeners. Deepeners argued
that because the applying countries were, for the most part, small in size,
their accession would inevitably shift the political balance in the EU away
from the four large countries that had dominated the Union since 1973
(Great Britain, france, Germany, and Italy) to the srnaller countries.52
Moreover, argued the deepeners, adding countries to the Union would slow
down integration as the EU would integrate the new members.
50 Ibidem
‘ John McCormick, The European Union. Politics and Poticies, 2”’ edition, BouMer, CO,Westview Press, 1999, p. 73.
52 Wilson, op. cit., p. 409.
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Conversely, for countries uneasy with the intensification of the
EU’s role, enlargement was seen as the solution. British Prime Minister
John Major, for example, favoured widening mainly because he opposed
integration.53 On the other hand, countries in favour of further integration
were most reluctant to enlarge, France being a prime example. This picttire,
however, was flot entirely clear-cut. Germany, generaÏly an advocate of
ftirther integration, was also a strong supporter of expanding the EU.
Reasons for this are numerous, and will be studied in greater detail
throughout this essay.
And now, in the context of the enlargement versus integration
dichotomy, let us examine Germany’s predicament afier its reunification.
We will follow Germany’s transition through the 1990s and the evolution of
its position on questions of enlargement and integration of the EU.
II. Germany withïn the EC
On October 3td 1990, the GenTian Democratic Republic dissolved
into West Germany. This was joined by another extraordinary, though
largely unnoticed, event: East German territories, in that same moment,
joined the EC. The EC had pÏayed a limited role as to the pace and nature of
unification, but it had nonetheless provided a framework within which
McCormick, op. cit., p. 73.
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unification couid take place. Whule Moscow had heid the key to unification,
West Germany had to work within a European ftamework in order to unite
the two Germanys. This meant that West Germany had to appease its
European partners, uncertain of what a united Germany miglit bring, and,
more importantly, it had to secure East Germany accession to the EC.
At the time of the unification, Germany vas at pains to point out
the continuity of German attachment to the EC and to its further integration.
After ail, for forty-five years, West Germany’s relationship to Europe had
been one of stability and equilibrium. West Germany had been an active
promoter of integration starting from Adenauer, who saw this as a means of
overcoming Germany’s disastrous past. By the 1970s, ail German poiitical
parties had adopted the une of an ‘increasing integration’ as had been laid
down in the Treaty ofRome.54
The federal Republic had drawn its economic prosperity and
political iegitimacy from its membership in a larger European project which
in tum “gained strength from Germany’s constructive engagement on the
Continent.”55 Foreign policy, which then meant mostiy European policy,
had been central in this process. vVi1iiam E. Paterson, director of the
Institute for German Studies at the University of Birmingham, explains that
Hans-Peter Schwarz, “Germany’s National and European Interests”, from AmulfBaring,
ed. Germany’s New Position in Europe. Problems and Perspectives, Oxford and
Providence, Berg, 1994, p. 109.
Jeffrey Anderson, German Unification and the Union of Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1999, p. 1.
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the federal Republic consisted of a foreign policy in search of a state,
instead of a state in search of a foreign policy.56 According to European
editor of the financial Tirnes, David Marsh:
“During the four decades of partition, West Germany’s
overwhelming national interest was to prevent its new European
and North American allies from thinking that it had one that was
different from their own. The best method of keeping West
Germany’s hopes and ambitions in check was to ensure that they
were neyer out of une with those of the rest of the continent.
Channelled into a receptacle called Europe, they could become
both dignified and benign: for Germany, an unusual
combination.”57
Marsh explains the way in which Germany was perceived
throughout the Cold War era as financially strong yet politically obliging. In
other words, Germany, an economic giant, remained a ‘political dwarf’
However, as soon as unification becarne a possibility, old inhibitions about
Germany resurfaced. Great Britain and france were flot keen on seeing this
‘political dwarf grow into a giant with a population of over eighty million
and a powerful economy. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
cautioned against a “rash resolution of the German Question”, while french
president Francois Mitterrand saw German unification as a “legal and
56 William E. Paterson, “The Chancellor and foreign Policy”, from Adenaner to Kohi. The
Developrnent of the German Chancellorship, Stephen Padgett, ed. London, Hurst and
Company, 1994, p. 127.
David Marsh, Gerrnany and Europe. The crisis of Unity, London, Mandarin, 1994, p.
129.
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political impossibility.”58 When Kohi surprised Europe with his Ten-Point
Plan “for a confederal structure between the two German states, as a step
toward an inevitable unification in a federal state,”59 Europe’s reactions
‘s
became even more cntical ofGerrnany. Member States were sceptical about
Germany’s new place in Europe. More than one country perceived that the
EC was evolving into a Trojan horse for’ predominantly German national
interests.60 At the same time, many politicians and some rather influential
voices in the media seemed set on reminding Europe of Germany’s violent
past. German leaders saw that they could do littie more than seek refuge in
European integration.6’
III. Deeper Integration
— the Only Road to Reunification
In the midst of these emotions, the Bonn government saw that it
had to draw out its own policy of integration with the EC for at least tbree
reasons. first, deeper integration would cairn the fears that a re-united
Germany might embark on a dangerous path in foreign policy. By showing
its willingness to maintain and even promote its “self-entanglement” within
the Community, Germany was detemiined to prove the other countries
wrong. lis second goal was to maintain the close Franco-German relations
Anderson, op.cit., p. 33.
Joey Cloutier, Benoît Lemay and Paul Letourneau, “German Foreign Policy and
International Secarity”, from Inauspicious Beginnings. Principal Powers and International
Security Institutions after the C’old War. 1989-1999, Onnig Beylerian and Jacques
Lévesque, eU., MontreallKingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004, p. 112.60 Stephen Wood, Germany, Europe anti the Persistence of Nations. Transformation,
Interests anti Identity, 1989-1996, Aldershot, Asligate Publishing Ltd, 1998, p. 1.61 Anderson, op. cit., p. 33.
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that had been moulded over the years. The insecurities feit in Paris made
Germany even more resolute about pursuing further franco-German
initiatives within the EC. Finally, multilaterai integration was seen as the
best means of ensuring Germany’s stability and avoiding a rise of
nationaiism in Germany, as was occurring in other parts of Europe.62
Germany’s integration policies resonated weii with leaders like
Jacques Delors, then president ofthe European Commission, as well as with
countries such as France. Both were eager to secure from Germany an “early
and irreversible confirmation of its integration.”63 In March 1990, KohI
announced lis unwavering support for the goal of economic and monetary
union. France, however, was unappeased, though, like Gennany, it was
resolute in its support of deeper European integration. Kohi therefore
suggested, in April 1990, that he and Mitterrand submit a joint proposai to
the council on opening a second track in the European integration process.64
This second track took bold steps toward a second kind of union, a politicai
union, whidh would accompany the economic and monetary union that was
already in the makings. This union would include an integration of foreign,
security, and defence policies that would serve to ftirther entangle Germany.
An intergovemmental conference on political union was thus to nin parallel
to the formai discussions conceming the Economic and Monetary Union.
The combination of these two tracks, monetary and politicai, was in this
62 Miiller, op. cit., p. 158.
Anderson, op. cit., p. 34.64 MUller, op. cit., p. 159.
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way opening the course toward a stronger, more democratic Community and
a common foreign and security polic y.65
By agreeing to monetary and political union, Kohi had managed
to appease his European partners, although many questions conceming the
integration of the German Democratic Reub1ic remained unsolved. These
questions will not be treated in this essay, as they do flot directly relate to
the questions concerning the rntegration and enlargement of the EC. Suffice
it to say that the formai unification process was brought to a close in
October of 1990, and Germany, now larger and stronger, had to continue
affirming its piedge to greater integration before a worried EC.
IV. Turbulent fastern Neiglibours
While Germany was trying to prove its attachment to the EC, it
could not help but notice the rise in nationalisms on its eastern borders, nor
the desperate economic situation that plagued its eastem neighbours.
Germany remembered how the EC had helped Germany out of a similar
predicament at the end of the Second World War, and to Germany, it was
obvious that association and eventual membership of the Central and
Eastem European countries was necessary.
Anderson, op. cit., p. 34.
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Gerrnany understood that a guaranteed security in Europe was
something that could flot be neglected. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, German
Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1974 and 1992, explains: “if Eastern
Europe fares badly, Western Europe, too... will not prosper.”66 Germany
strongly believed that without enlargement, the yet unstable conditions of
Central and Eastern Europe could easily degenerate into security problems
for the EU. These problems, Germany predicted, would corne in the form of
refugees and asylum seekers, trans-border environmental pollution, and
increased international criminal activity and political terrorism, among other
things.67 Moreover, Gerrnany warned, an unstable situation in the East
would require military intervention from the West - a situation that Western
Europe had, during the 1990s, obviously not been able to control in ex
Yugoslavia. This, according to Kohi, was a crucial reason to bring in Central
and Eastern European countries into the Union, in that way preventing thern
from breaking down into ethnie rivairies, as had occurred in ex
Yugoslavia.68
With time, more arguments for enlargement arose, this time of
economic nature. However, during the period covered in this chapter,
Germany was stiil finding its place in Europe, sorting out its policies of
Michael J. Baun, A Wider Europe. The Frocess and Politics of EU Entargement,
Lanham, MD, Rowrnan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000 p. 8.67 Ibidem
McCormick, op. cit., p. 73.
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integration and enlargement and trying to see if either of these policies
should lead the way.
V. Contradiction in German Policies?
At first, Germany chU flot seè any contradiction between the
deepening and widening of the Community, as did many other Member
States. As mentioned earlier, Germany’s goal was to preserve stability in
Western Europe and to achieve stability in the whole of Europe, and it thus
saw deepening and widening as parts of one single process. Widening was
seen as indispensable if long-term political and economic stability were to
be achieved. While the widening process was to be prepared, Germany
argued, the Comrnunity would continue to accelerate the present integration
process. Germany maintained that if the Community were to remain as it
was, with its cumbersome institutions and processes of decision-making,
new members would do nothing more than paralyse the entire system. This
is why Germany pushed for the acceptance of majority voting in the
European Parliament, even if this meant that Germany would have to submit
to decisions that it did not approve. This emphasis on both deepening and
widening were promoted by Genscher and Kohi, and enjoyed a widespread
popularity among the Germans. Thus there was even disappointment, on the
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part of some Germans, when the Maastricht Treaty failed to open doors for
Central and Eastem European accession.69
Although Germany was in favour of enlargement and was its
principal proponent, Germany remained far more mbivalent on specific
aspects of the enlargement process than were other pro-enlargement
countries, notably Great Britain. This ambivalence stemmed from the fact
that Germany found it difficuit, at times, to reconcile enlargement with its
desire to promote deeper European integration.7° Since the end of the
Second World War, Germany’s main role had been to endorse and uphold
deeper integration within the EC. According to Henning Tewes, deputy
director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Poland, the deepening of
West European integration had become “a part of the self-conception of
West Gerrnany’s foreign policy-making elites.”7’ He explains that from
1990, the situation altered greatly, because for the first time in its recent
history, Germany could pursue its foreign interests and found enlargement
towards the East essential. Thus, “West Germany’s traditional self-
conception as an ‘integration deepener’ conflicted with the desire on behaif
ofthe united Germany to press for EU enlargement.”72 This was why, in the
first haif of the 1990s, Germany’s promotion of enlargement was rather
hesitant, and Germany took priority on deepening over widening.73
69 Miiller, op. cit., p. 159.
° Tewes, op. cit., p. 117.
Ibidem
7’
= Ibidem
‘ Ibidem., p. 118.
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This contrasted with previous ‘traditional’ German foreign
policies that favoured integration. German policy-makers had then the task
of solving this problem; a task which they thought coIld be solved by one of
the following three strategies. first, as we have already mentioned, they
ignored, or did flot sec, that any such ‘conflict between deepening and
widening even existed. Secondly, they tried to segregate the roles of
integration and enlargement. And the third phase was an attempt to merge
the two. At no point in this strategy-planning did a fundamental redefinition
of Germany’s role take place. Thus, integration remained the main priority
in Germany’s European diplomacy.74
However, with the establishment of reform democracies in the
Central and Eastem European countries, new demands were placed on
Germany. They conflicted with its traditional role as a promoter of deeper
integration. At first, Germany did flot react to these demands, and, as we
have seen, it eagerly bound itself even more strongly to the Community
through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, Germany saw that it was flot
viable to limit Europe to twelve or even fifteen members. Germany thus
found itself in an impasse, for expansion seemed incompatible with the idea
of a homogenous economic and currency bloc that was striving to achieve a
common foreign and defence policy envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty.
Ibidem
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Germany then, according to Henning Tewes, found itself in a role
conflict between its roles as an integration deepener and an integration
widener. On one level, Germany understood that EU membership was a
crucial element of stabilisation, and at the same time Germany was faced,
more than any other EU country, with increasing expectations from the
Central and Eastern European countries. Although these countries remained,
at first, suspicious of German hegemony, they too, understood that both
Gennany and Central and Eastern European countries had vested interests in
EU enlargement. It is not surprising then, that as early as 1991-92, Germany
ensured its support for enlargement by signing bilateral treaties with several
Central and Eastern European countries.75 AIl this was happening against a
background of even further integration as Germany pursued both objectives
simultaneously.
Though Germany tried to achieve both its objectives of
enlargement and integration in a complementary manner, it oflen found
itself in a conflicting position. Moreover, Western European countries were
flot clear about the roles which they expected Germany to play. They
expected Germany to ratify the Maastricht Treaty and to join the European
Monetary Union on the one hand, yet some even began supporting
Germany’s interest in Eastern enlargement. However, Western countries
tended to remain wary of Germany’s interest in enlargement. Sometimes,
the “Germanisation” thesis would take over, where, according to several EU
75lbidem., p. 122.
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countries, enlargement was going to increase Germany’s weight
substantially within the EU by the two rounds of enlargement towards the
North and East. This argument maintained that the Northeast bloc would
end up bound more tightly together by economic, political and cultural links
against a (poorer and weaker) southern bloc dominated by France.76 This
however, remained a marginal view, and did flot occupy rnuch place among
major EU thinkers. Moreover, by this time, the EU was concerned with its
own problems such as the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the collapse
of the Economic Monetary System, and an economic recession. It had littie
time to dwell on worrying about the North-Eastern Germanic bloc.
Ibidem
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2. Germany Speaks Up: The Second Haif ofthe 1990s
I. After Maastricht
As Europe entered the second halfthe 1990s, Germany’s weight
no longer posed a threat for its European counterparts. It began to increase
its voice within the EU, and put more emphasis on what its own interests
were. It was no longer as prone to its “leadership avoidance reflex”,77 which
had dominated its post-World War Two policies and through the first haif of
the 1990s. There were several reasons for this, most importantly the
decreased reliance on the United States, and the extemal pressure from
European countries to work as a “motor” for EU integration. More and
more, Central and Eastem Europeans looked west to Germany, seeing
Gennany as a country in “. . .prime position to influence greatly the events in
Central and Eastem Europe, given its physical proxirnity to the region, its
historical ties and consequent perceived obligations, its experience with the
transformation process in the former GDR. . .“ This transition thus
happened both inside of Gennany and in the countries surrounding it.
Germany feit now more comfortable to pursue its own interests, but stili
held on to the discourse that what Germany wanted was essentially what
was best for Europe.
Stephen D. Collins, Gennan Poticy-Making and EU Entargement during the Kolil Era.
Managing the Agenda? Manchester/New York, Manchester University Press, 2002, p. 4.
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Thus, despite of, or as a resuit of, this change in its position in
Europe, Gerrnany continued to promote enlargement. This did not change
the fact that Gennany was intent on preserving the acquis communautaire,
though quite aware that enlargernent would have a paralysing effect on the
decision- and policy-making process in the EU. Germany specified,
however, that it wouid be far more affected by enlargernent than any other
Member State, stating that firstly enlargernent was due to happen on
Genuany’s borders and secondly, that this would probably happen at
Germany’s expense. Gerrnany insisted therefore that it did not want
enlargement to be a “German project”, and thus wanted other Member
States to share the burden, both politically and financially.79 With Germany
strongly maintaining this position, it became obvious that it was increasingly
taking a firmer stance, particularly afier the election of a new govemment in
September of 1998. This transformation came as something of a novelty to
Europe.8°
Germany was thus finding itseif in an increasingly uncomfortable
situation. On the one hand, it was demanding support from other Member
States on Eui-opean matters that it found important: graduai reforrn of the
Common Agricultural Policy, restrictions on the free movement of labour
Lippert, op. cit., p. 14.
° Paul Letourneau, “La politique étrangère allemande. Style nouveau et fidélité au
multilatéralisme,” from Revue d’Allemagne et des Pays de langtte allemande, April-June
1999, vol. 31, number 2, P. 333.
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and reduced net contribution to the EU.8’ At the same time, it neyer ceased
to press for a swifter enlargement for which it had a “vital interest”.82
Indeed, despite the sensitive issues mentioned above, ail of
Gerrnany’s major social, economical and social forces — which inciude ail
political parties, every govemment and opposition party in the sixteen
German Liinder, unions of entrepreneurs, trade unions, church and social
groups, acadernic experts and other opinion leaders83 - supported
enlargement as a “political necessity and a historicai chance” for Germany
and Europe.84 As Germany neared the end of the 2Oth century, its
for enlargement could be narrowed to two: to achieve stability in the region
and to intensify business with the new market economies. Yet despite
considerable economic gains, Germany’s interest in expanding the EU was
largely based on political considerations and on continuity with its
Ostpotitik and European policies since the end ofthe 1960s.85
Germany continued, during this time, to pursue its dual strategy
of deepening and widening in the EU. However, in the course of the 1990s,
Gerrnany’s integration policies became more cautious and deliberate than
those preceding the Maastricht Treaty, when Germany had feit the need to
‘ Lippert, op.cit., p14.
82 Mathias Jopp, “Gerrnany and EU Enlargernent”, from East-CentraÏ Europe and the EU.
Problems ofintegration, Karl Kaiser and Martin Briining, ed. Bonn, Europa Union Verlag,
1996, p. 107.
83 Lippert, op.cit., p. 14.
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anchor itself ever more firmly to the EC. This attenuation in its integration
policy and the new displayed caution toward EU reforms could be seen at
the Amsterdam Summit which rnodified the ambitious programme laid out
in the rnulti-party coalition agreement ofNovember 1
ythi, 1994. Indeed, apart
from the European Monetary Union, there was no identifiable movement
towards political union.86
Eastward enlargement, on the other hand, did flot lose its
momentum, certainly not under Kohl’s last government. He believed that
Gerniany had historically been open to enlargement of the EC (with the
notable exception of Turkey, which was being treated as a special case), and
saw enlargement as a European solution to peace, stability and prosperity.
He looked toward the southem countries as proof that the EU’s
Mediterranean Policy had paid off, and saw no reason that the same would
flot occur in Central and Eastem Europe.
Moreover, Gerniany was “by far the biggest trading partner of the
Central and Eastem European countries.”87 Thus, not only geographical
proximity, but trade, developing since the late 1980s, played a significant
role in Germany’s policy to enlarge the Union.88
86 Ibide,,i
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Enlargernent of the EU defmitely had its advantages for
Germany. It gave Gerrnany a larger arid safer medium through which it
could exercise its own power in areas of both domestic and foreign poiicy.
The domestic advantage was that in enlarging the EU, Gennany would flot
be tempted to act alone with regard to the Central and Eastem European
countries. On the contrary, as a resuit of its attachirient to the EU, ail of
Germany’s bilateral treaties with these countries had been “fully
cornplementary of the EU’s Europe Agreements and supportive of the pre
accession strategy and the rnembership perspective offered by the Union.”89
This channelling of Gerrnany’s Eastem policies through the EU reassured
Germany that it remained anchored in the West, ail the while pursuing its
interests in Eastern Europe. The question did not disappear altogether, and
continued to be asked: would enlargement to the East affect the EU’s
importance within Germany, despite the fact that Germany would continue
pursuing its goals rnostly within a multilateral framework and enlarged
institutions?90 This question remained on many European rninds as the
process to eventual accession of the Central and Eastem European countries
becarne doser to reality.
Lippert, op.cit., p. 15.
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II. Germans Express Themselves
It would be impossible to conclude an essay on German attitudes
toward enlargement without referring to Genrian public opinion. Leaders in
Berlin feared the public’s reluctance with regard to enlargement. Between
1989 and 1999 many changes had been imposed on the public — from
reunification to a common European currency. Germans increasingly feit
that, in financing the unification and fifty percent of the Community’s
budget, too mucli was being demanded of them. It is no wonder that many
regarded enlargernent of the EU with a sceptical eye, wondering how much
this would cost them this tirne. However, there was no political party, such
as Jorg Haider’s Liberty Party (fPÔ) in Austria, which openly opposed the
enlargernent of the EU.9’
Surveys confirm that pro-European attitudes in the German
public experienced a decline.92 The rise of Euro-scepticism was oflen related
to the feeling that Europe was out of control, that it was flot democratic
enougli, and, as usual, that Germany paid too much for the other Member
States. The disappointment following the Nice Treaty could be seen by the
decrease of satisfaction with the European system that declined from 44
percent in 1999 to 35 percent in 2OOO. The German public was not alone
91 Jean-François Drevet, L ‘Élargissement de l’Union européenne, jusqu ‘où? Paris,
L’Harmattan, 2001, P. 153.
92 Henri de Bresson, La nouvelle AlÏemagne, Paris, Editions Stock, 2001, p. 198,
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in this disenchantment with the EU. Many Europeans deplored its
democratic illegitirnacy and a large number ofthern were simpÏy indifferent
to the whole process.
III. Conclusion
As has been shown, Genriany overcame the uncomfortable
predicament that plagued its European policy-making after unification.
Germany was once again, as it had often been during recent history, faced
with a tug-of-war between the East and the West. Only this time, while
Germany had real links to the West, it feit that its security and well-being
could only be assured with stability in the East. At the beginning, Germany
was hesitant to place too rnuch emphasis on enlargement, be it to the North
or East. It was too preoccupied with reaffirming its place within the EC and
proving to Europe that it remained fimily anchored in the West. Afler the
Maastricht Treaty, Gerrnany began to feel more confident with regard to its
place in Europe, and saw key interests in a European enlargement to the
East. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty had left more than one German
disappointed, and integration policies, while stili crucial to Germany, were
no longer as stridently pursued.
Thus, Gennany took more interest in its economic involvement
with the Central and Eastern European countries. While integration was stili
4$
Germany’s main goal, many conflicts had to be resolved, such as
agricultural reforms, which let the integration process falÏ behind the
enlargement negotiations. Between 1997 and 1999, Germany focused
strongly on the integration and deepening of the EU which continued
holding a central place on its political agenda. It managed, however, to
balance deepening with its politics of enlargernent. Gerrnaiy wanted the
momentum of the original members to continue on, and remain, at least on
the political level, if not in public opinion, very much attached to keeping
this “Old Europe”, in other words, the original EC, alive.
Meanwhile, historians and politicians of this era followed
Gerrnany carefully, at first unsure of where it would tread, eventually
dropping their guard and focusing more on Germany’s specific poÏicies with
regard to various aspects of integration and enlargement. In the following
chapter, we will see how The Economist perceived these events.
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PART THREE:
THROUGH THE EYES 0F
THE ECONOMI$T
1. The First Stage: 1989 to 1994
I. Introduction
Both the unification of Gerrnany and the deeper integration of
Europe constantly interested The Economist, which covered them in alrnost
every issue. The editorials, written mostly with optimisrn and a touch of
humour, offer the reader a more personal viewpoint of the events
transforming Europe.
A survey ofthe articles written between 1989 and 1992 leave the
reader with a two-sided image of Germany. On the one hand, admiration is
shown as to the economic prowess of Germany. On the other hand, a certain
reservation and misgiving is demonstrated. A sample of tities is quite
telling94. They capture the imagination, particuiarly when accompanied by
cartoons illustrating either malevolent aspects (aiways with historical
“Worried about West Germany”, The Economist, febniary 18 1989, p. 14.; “Weimar it isn’t, but Watch
Out”, The Economist, Mardi 18 1989, P. 43. ; “The German Question”, The Econornist, October 12 1991,
p. 18.; “Kohl’s Anschluss”, Thefconomist, February 17 1990, P. 16.; “Looming Germany”, The
Economist, Mardi 10 1990, p. 13; “Deutschland, Deutschland tiber Ailes”, Tue Economist, January 13
1990, p. 43.; “Gerrnany Benign?”, The Economist, January 27 1990, p. 13.
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connotations) of Germany or of the growing (and therefore menacing)
economic and political power of this newly reunited country. This is a
tendency that reached its peak at the end of 1990, before slowly dying away.
In 1991, cartoons of Gerrnany become rarer, and from 1992, few are to be
found altogether.
As for the content of the articles itself, it too, became
progressively less critical with regard to Gennany, albeit at a siower pace.
Indeed it is impossible flot to notice the ironie tone initially employed by
The Economist. Although it is far from expressing ultranationalist worries,
certain ambivalence was conveyed with regard to Germany that cannot be
ignored. It is by examining several articles that we will grasp the essence of
The Econornist’s vision of Germany, its opinion with regard to the EC, as
well as its way of interpreting the “German Question” in the early 1990s.
This type of analysis, covering over a hundred articles and
exploring continuity versus discontinuity in the coverage, is familiar to
analysts and specialists in media and communication. This method of
anaÏysis is best described by LassweÏÏ:
“When it is desired to survey politically significant communication for
any historical period on a global scale, the most practicable method is
that of counting the occurrence of key symbols and clichés. Only in
this way can the overwhelming mass of material be reliably and briefly
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summarized. By charting the distributions in space and time, it
is
possible to show the principal contours of... political history.”95
It is important to keep in mmd that most of the information used
for the purpose of this thesis is derived from editorial articles and s
pecial
surveys covering either Germany or the EU. Indeed, according to leading
quantitative analysis specialists, “politically significant symbols are usuaÏÏy
concentrated in the front page or editorial page.”96 Regular political and
financial coverage is rnost often brief, less persona and opinionated, and
most hints of any particular attitude or judgment can be found in the titie
only. Thus, this essay will entirely disregard financial and business articles,
which deal littie, if flot at ail, with the political implications of Germany
within the EU, and will use only several articles that are part of the weekly
political coverage of Europe. Moreover, certain periods will have more
articles concerning Gennany than others. This will be discussed in the
conclusion but will in no way affect the analysis, which will be ordered both
thematically and chronologically.
The articles which will be studied will oflen be quoted, at least in
part, in the original. This is because the rewording of articles is flot aiways
effective in transmitting the desired message. According to most specialists
on qualitative analysis of texts, it is crucial to rernain close to the original
text, for any reformulation or change hinders the message that the text is
Danielson and Larosa, op. lit., p. 103.
96 Jbjde,,i p. 104.
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trying to follow through.97 At times articles will be combined and cornpared
with one another, while at others one particular aspect of the article will be
concentrated on. We will seek to understand where The Economist stood
with regard to Germany, and how this opinion is cornbined with the place
The Economist believed the EU should have during the Ïast decade of the
2Oth century.
II. Early views on Germany
“Are you Afraid of Germany?” Thus began an article dated
October 12, 1991. According to The Economist, this question was at the
base of any discussion conceming the future of a federal EC. No attempt to
answer it was made in this article. The Economist claimed that it was a
question that continuously hovered in the back of the Community Member
States’ minds. It was the only way, continued the article, to explain why
preparations for the intergovernmental conference in Maastricht, which were
initially supposed to treat only economic and monetary aspects of the
Community, had acquired an increasingly political aspect. Moreover, and
more interestingly, The Economist claimed that those who were most afraid
of Germany were the Germans themselves. The consensus among historians
confirms this opinion. Indeed, as was seen in great detail in the previous
See Danielson and Larosa, op. lit., aiid Kirnberly Neuendorf, Tue Content Analvsis
Guidebook, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications, 2002.
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chapter, the Gernians were no less worried, if not more, about the future of a
reunited Germany, than was the rest ofthe EC.
As The Economist was quick to point out, a united Germany was
suddenly mucli larger and potentially more audacious and inclined to the
East. The article supported this opinion by quoting several Gernian leaders
doing everything to avoid their violent past, their goal being “to bind their
country securely into the Comrnunity.”98 One specific quotation is
especially interesting: “Better do the tethering soon, they [the Germaii
leaders] say darkly; in a few years the beast wiÏl be stronger, wilder,
possibly untameable.”99 The word “beast”, no matter in which way
interpreted, was in no way flattering to Germany. The article, whose
provocative titie “Are you Afraid of Gerniany?” was remained unanswered,
leaves the reader with a rather foreboding image of Germany.
The Econornist did flot provide an entirely one-dimensional
image of Genriany. However, the alternative arguments were portrayed with
less conviction. The Econornist highlighted the argument that “ail this
worrying about Gerrnany [was] out of date” and that therefore it was
uimecessary to emphasise the importance of a federal Europe. This opinion
claimed that whiïe Germany was Europe’s “economic powerhouse”, it was
not its “superpower”, and so whule its exports were twice those of France,
98
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they were less than a third of the EC total.’°° Though The Econonzist did not
discount this argument, it did point out that this opinion, which sought to
appease Europeans, xvas one that was mostÏy heard from a “safe distance
across a stretch of water from continental Europe”- the allusion to the
United States and Great Britain could flot be clearer. Moreover, in view of
its hesitance with regard to a more federal Europe, it was no surprise that
Great Britain would be quick to adopt such a une of thought. Thus, The
Economist presented us with continental Europeans on the one side, more
affected and thus more concemed about the future ofboth Germany and the
EC, and, on the other side, with more optimistic Great Britain and United
States, their lands and economies much less threatened by a stronger
Geniiany, indeed a ‘safe distance away’ from the events on the Continent.
In the same article, this British and American opinion was
shunned aside, and considered unrealistic. The Economist claimed that
though few Germans would admit to supporting a European federation in
order to pursue old national interests, they may be doing so, albeit in a
twisted manner. The Economist brought a suggestive quotation by Bismarck
in 1876: “I have aiways found the word Europe in the mouths of those
politicians who were demanding from other powers something that they did
flot dare dernand in their own name.”101 The Economist concluded this
paragraph in a similar train of thought, saying: “A federal Europe, with
100 Ibidem
lOi ibidem
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Germany at its heart, offers Germans the chance to extend their influence in
ail directions. The common German argument - embrace us now o;- regret it
later - can almost sound like blackmail.”°2
This image of Gerrnany was indeed threatening, aÏrnost alanning,
considering the late date - October 1991. However negatively Germany was
portrayed in this article, and however ‘beneficial’ the EC was made to be for
Gerrnany, The Economist drew on one last argument, this tirne of a more
positive nature, before concluding the article. The journal suggested that
Europeans need not get carried away by their fright of a more powerful
Germany, indeed, that they should see things more cÏeariy. Z7ie Economist
argued that if Gei-many was ready to cede some of its sovereignty, as it
clearly was, it should be seen as an opportune moment for the rest of Europe
to take advantage of this. The Economist reasoned that Europeans wouÏd
certainly prefer a Europe strongly influenced by Germany (and vice versa)
to a neutral Germany, free to do whatever it pleased. Thus, The Economist
agreed that Germany must be bound within the Community, and therefore it
advocated a more integrated Europe. This opinion, that Germany was best
bound within Europe in order to avoid any resurgence of German supremacy
in Europe, evolved throughout the 1990s, as The Economist started to view
both Germany and the EC in a different light. In the following chapters, the
beginning ofthis transformation will become obvious.
102 Ibidem., p. 19.
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UI. Reunification
“Is Gemian unification cause for Europeans to tremble?” The
Economist asked. In an article praising Helmut Kohi and the ability with
which he rnanaged to convince leaders that German unification was
necessary, The Econornist wrote that this was flot the restless and unhappy
Germany of the past, certainly not after forty years of democracy, wealth,
and social justice. Tue Economist added that the new Germany would iiot be
a replica of the old Federal Republic, “mainly western-minded since birth”
but it would be a new state, very much conceptuaÏly in Central Europe, more
inclined to “involve itself in Russia’s plight than stand aloof.”°3 Nor was
The Economist completely trusting of this new Germany: “. . .even encased
in European structures, like a float at a carnival, the Gennan bulldozer may
well veer off in new directions.”104 The Econoinist suspected that Germans
may even cool in their enthusiasm for a doser European integration, for a
European defence force, and for a monetary union that would replace their
“cherished D-Mark”.105 They might promote the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) instead, in order to give themselves
more room to manoeuvre, as opposed to a common EC foreign policy. The
idea aone would be enough, The Economist claimed, to make Germany into
quite a “daunting neighbour for the weaker states around it.”106
103
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Moreover, The Econornist insisted that European leaders should
not take “Kohi at his word” when he spoke of Germany and European unity
as one, but shouid make sure that Germany was, indeed, committed to be
more strongly integrated into the EC. This would ensure a less fearful and
more manageable Germany than would any alternative. The Economist
opined that Germany was already too “brawny to twist”. Ail that could now
be done was to have European leaders encourage Germany to take the path
of a tighter European unity. Tue Econornist criticised Thatcher for flot doing
so, and claimed that it was “high tirne Thatcher came round to reality.” The
Economist openly stated that it was afraid that if Germany decided that a
tighter EU was flot in its interests, unity would loosen, and there would be
no stopping German hegemony, even if it were benign. The Economist thus
saw the EC as the ideal system within which European countries could
mutually influence each other.’°7
As of June 1990, the magazine offered a detailed survey of
Gennan unification. Tue Economist brought a quote by Napoleon III, cited
in part in the first chapter of this essay. Both historians and The Economist
must have found this citation useful, The Economist using it to admonish
Thatcher for her European policies108:
107 Ibidem
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“The Road to EMU”, The Economist, June 30 1990, p. 17.
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“It may be very well to say that Germany is flot an aggressive Power,
but who can say when she may not become so? And that she may flot
some day... seek to unite within ber boundaries the Russo-German
provinces of the 3altic?
You English have chosen to withdraw yourselves from the political
area of Europe, and this abstention of England from active
participation in European politics is a great misfortune for Europe, and
will later prove to be a great misfortune for herseif.”
Napoleon iiI to Loi-d
Augustus Lofttts, Britisiz Ambassador to Berlin, 1868109
This quotation was displayed at the top of an article about
Germany’s reunification. Though The Econornist did not appear to view
Gerrnany as a real threat, it did flot exciude the possibility that Germany
may be a power that could yet rise, and should therefore be contained,
within the EC, in a steadfast and thorough manner.
The Economist did not, however, simply focus on economic
factors or the size of the German population to shed doubt on Germany. It
identified symbolic factors as issues that had to be deait with in their own
right. One particular issue, which received coverage in more than one article
in The Economist, was the possible location of Gemiany’s capital. Germany,
on its road to reunification, now asked to have its new Hauptstadt in Berlin.
In a particularly telling article entitÏed “Ich bin ein Bonner” from July 1990,
The Econornist did flot leave any doubts as to its opinion.
109
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While The Economist did say that Germany was past the stage
where other nations shouÏd teli it what to do, it believed that Germans
should consider several important factors before deciding upon their new
capital. According to The Economist, Berlin had too many sombre
memories, practically only associated with visions of Kaiser Wilhelm II,
Hitler and communist Gerrnany. Bonn, on the other hand, represented
democracy and federalisrn, and stood for the Germany that Europeans
“know and love”0. Moreover, Berlin, already a big city, would, by
becoming a capital city, attract lobbyists, corporate headquarters, banks and
courts. It would becorne bigger and more centralized. The clinch, for The
Econo,nist, was that Berlin as a capital city would resuit in an eastern shift
that would be bound to disturb Gennany’s Western neighbours, especially
since that could induce a shift of Germany’s politics. The Economist made
its position clear- Berlin as capital was not a good idea. Bonn worked
perfectÏy welÏ under the Federal Republic and there was therefore no reason
to disturb the status quo)’1
We see then that The Econornist professed that Germany’s
policies were as yet unstable, that the country needed to be continuously
anchored in the West, that it had, in short, no business moving its centre of
gravity eastwards. Yet, as German reunification loomed doser, The
HO
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Economist progressively showed a more pragmatic view of the situation. It
explained that Gerrnany’s predicament was, ail things considered, not ail
that simple. It was a country caught between different interests, each one
expecting something else of Germany. The Soviet Union, for example, was
hoping for financial aid, while the United States was looking for a ‘partner
in leadership’, in other words, for a more active foreign policy role on the
part of Germany. East Gennany, meanwhiÏe, was expecting an economic
miracle. At the same time, the EC was pushing for a more committed
Germany and for rnonetary union as Gerrnany began to hesitate in its rush
for monetary union for the first time since the conception of this idea. The
Eastern European countries, for their part, were also asking for considerable
financial help. The Economist explained that Germany could flot possibly be
expected to satisfy ail these demands, though Gerrnany had made promises
in this sense.’12
While The Economist did bring to the fore the different
preoccupations GenTlany was facing, it saw these as a representation of
Gennany’s new and “enhanced status in the world”113 and maintained its
ambivalence towards this representation of Germany. It pointed accusingly
to the Franco-Gennan relationship, previously an exalted pillar of the EC,
and now rapidly deteriorating — a direct resuit, claimed The Econornïst, of
Germanys new and expanded size. The Economist likened a reunited
112
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Germany in Europe to a giant Gulliver among the Lilliputians. It continued
by explaining that Germanys indecision, and the skill and sensitivity
required cf Germany to successfully appease ail neighbours and allies,
would end up weighing heavily on Germanys future. This, maintained Tue
Economist, made the future seem “rather daunting.”114 For The Economist
did not predict that things would mn as smoothly as Germany promised. It
threw several questions into the open: “[Would] Europhilia really make
Gerrnany ready to give up sovereignty just when it got it back?” and wouÏd
Germans “give up the D-mark just when East Germans [were] experiencing
its security for the first time?”1 15 The Econornist answered with no
ambivalence: “Where interests conflict, the Germans will put their own
interest first.”116 The Economist added that Mr. Kohi had been remarkable in
putting German interests ahead during the past year and obtaining
reunification for Germany. The Economist remained less certain about
Kohl’s instinct when it came to the good of Europe as a whole.1t7
We thus see that in the early 1990s, The Economist saw the
European idea as a safeguard against a rapid rise of Germany. It promoted
the idea of integration, and suggested that European leaders make sure that
Germany did not leave the path of furthering the EU. And yet, the idea of
further integration had many implications, political and economic, not all of
Ibidem., p. 14.
115 Ibidem
116 Ibidem
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which concurred with The Econornist’s vision of a united Europe. Tndeed, as
the Maastricht Treaty neared, The Econornist made its ideas clear to the
public, and proposed its vision of an integrated union.
IV. Is Monetary Union Worthwhile?
The main goal of the Maastricht Treaty was to initiate the
currency unification arnong the countries of the EC. According to The
Econornist, the notion of an econornic and monetary union was positive and
was therefore to be strongly encouraged. It was the idea of a political union,
one that gained mornentum with the reunification of Germany, which The
Economist found absurd. “We would like a single European currency, but
we dislike the idea of a federal superstate.”1 In this article The Economist
conftonted Gerrnany, who alongside France, both defended and prornoted
the idea of political union and of a stronger integration of the EC. For The
Economist, it was understandable that France should like to have its age-old
rival tied to the EC as much as possible. Genriany’s position, on the other
hand, aroused suspicion, for, more than any other country in the EC,
Gemiany stood the most to gain)’9
We thus sec that while Tue Econornist continued to be
apprehensive towards Germany, this apprehension had changed its form. No
‘
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longer as pessirnistic with regard to Germany’s place in Europe, it
nonetheless did not approve of Germany’s overly integrationist view of the
EC, and tried to understand where it came from. According to The
Economist, the idea of a political union became attractive to Germany as a
resuit of the upheaval in Eastem Europe, for Germany’s position in Europe
was now seen as shaky by many Western leaders. “The perceived threat was
the need to get Germany committed, and the EC more integrated, before
Gennany became wayward, and too many new members diluted the original
European vision. The answer was the aberrant dash towards a treaty on
political union.”20
The distinction between political and monetary union was
stressed because The Economist was much more conciliatory towards
Gerrnany with regard to monetary union. Germany, The Economist
adrnitted, was the one willing to lose one of its few symbols of national
pride, its Deutschmark. The Economist indeed remarked that the country
which would be risking the most fiom a monetaiy union vas not Great
Britain, despite its loud daims to the contrary, but Germany. “[The] D-Mark
lias a proud record. Sterling is a rake; the sooner it is durnped, the better.”2’
We can therefore note a strong support for a monetary union, a position that
was confirmed time and again in articles such as “Rethinking EMU”22 and
‘20”What a Community”, The Economist, November 2 1991, p. 13.
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“The Flaw in Thatcher’s Europe”123. It was quite another story, as we have
just seen, with regard to an eventual political union.
IV. What Type of Union?
The Economist made it clear that it found Gerrnany to be the
biggest advocate of the European project. In an article conceming the
European Parliarnent’24, The Economist brought forward Germany’s role in
pressing for more power for the European Parliarnent. The reason, The
Eeonornist affirmed, that Germany was so forthcoming with regard to a
stronger European Parliament, was that it viewed Europe as an entity that
should resemble something along the unes of a “United States of
Europe”125. Such a leap, argued The Econornist, would be a mistake. The
reason for this was that, other than Germans, not enough Europeans shared
in Gem1any’s idea of a federal EC. Moreover, the European Parliament
should prove itself before allowing it much more power, and according to
The Economist, it would be better to let the Parliarnent advance in “small
steps”, and this, not only in order to appease the Germans, but because with
time the project might seem sensible in itself’26
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This does not mean that The Economist did not believe that a
European federation couÏd work. Federations, claimed The Econornist, when
they work, are an “excellent way of accommodating differences within a
single systern.”127 However, The Economist did flot perceive the EC to be
ready for this, no matter how mucli Germany or any other country would
insist that it was. A “United States of Europe” would mean having a
common foreign policy and a central govemment that would have ultimate
sovereignty, and where states would only be able to legislate in certain
areas)28 This was flot sornething Europeans were ready to commit
themselves to, wrote The Economist. Moreover, while the EC was formed as
a result of fear of a war between Gerrnany and France, the EC of the 1990s
did not draw on the same fear, and therefore people were more apt to be
interested in a common rnarket and even a common currency, but flot much
more.129 The idea of a federation was one that produced many debates in
Europe at the tirne, especially among Germans. This project was notably
dismissed by the British in the run-up to the foïlowing Intergovemmental
Conference, and, as we have seen, The Econoinist held no differently from
the British viewpoint, bringing strong arguments against the idea of a
federation.
What then did The Econornist think was best for Europe? As we
have seen, it believed that Germany needed to be integrated firmly within
127
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the EC, and especially to allow for a monetary union to take place. In th
is
context, it believed that the only way that the EC could succeed in its
mission was if Germany’s place in Europe was stable and secure. Because
of Gennany’s preponderant weight in Europe, any unrest within the country
could shake the entire Community. Thus, the economic instability in
Gerniany that followed the high costs of reunification put the whole
question of rnonetary integration, let alone political integration, to test. This
new situation, concluded The Econontist, brought back the ‘German
question’, only this time, in quite a different form.
The Economist explained itself: During the reunification of
Germany the uppermost fear in Europe was “that a resurgent Germany
might dorninate its neighbours too rnuch”.13° Now The Economist, along
with the rest of Europe, feared that Germany might not be strong enough.
Too much, it seemed, depended on Gennany. Eastem Europe and the former
Soviet Republics looked toward Germany for financial aid and West
Europeans relied on Gerrnany as the anchor of the European exchange-rate
rnechanism. According to Tue Economist, the upcoming Maastricht Treaty
on econornic and rnonetary union was “unlikely to succeed” if Germany’s
con-imitrnent to the EC weakened. “Much is at stake flot just for Gerrnany
but for the European Community and beyond.”13
“The New German Question”, The Economist, May 2 1992, p. 15.
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It is interesting to see how rnuch had changed in the two years
since German unification. Now The Econornist found it important that
Gerrnany regain its economic strength and devoted an entire page to the
matter in the article “A New Genrian Question” explaining the implications
of Germany’s weakening economy and gave several suggestions to rectify
the situation. for The Economist, Germany’s econornic stability was
indispensable for the EU to succeed, and thus it was imperative that
measures be taken to overcome Germany’s economic slump. The
Economist’s enthusiasrn for a European monetary union was in no way
disguised.
Yet, as the Maastricht Treaty approached, the idea of monetary
union became as important as that of political unity in Europe. Tue
Economist did not mince its words in showing its standpoint. It clearly
expressed its distaste for a doser political union, saying that Europe was
neither apt, nor ready, to follow through with this vision. Moreover, because
both unions were to be addressed equalÏy in the referendums on the
Maastricht Treaty, doser economic union would be at stake. What is more,
wrote The Econornisi, the very idea of doser political union would
jeopardise the rightwing vote. The cost would be the Ioss of a common
European rnarket, a loss which would be unfortunate, according to The
Economist. 132
32
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As Maastricht neared, The Economist found that it was not the
only one sceptical of a doser poiitica union. It explained that Germa
ny,
previously one of the biggest proponents of European integration, was
starting to be less certain of its strive for an ever doser union. The
Economist of March of 1992 wrote that Germans were “wailing about the
Maastricht Conferencc in December”33. The Econornist had an interesting
perspective on Gennany’s changing role in Europe. It wrote that whule there
was no need to worry that Europe’s “weightiest nation believes it can do
better on its own”, it did think that it was a “warning sign” for the EU.134
The Economist explained that Germany had, for ail the years previous to its
reunification, used the European idea as a “semi-substitute” for its own
defeated and occupied fatherland. This is why, according to The Economist,
neither England nor, to a lesser extent France, had ever quite had the same
enthusiasm and neither strives for a deeper European integration. Thus
Germany, which saw in the EU an indelibly important function, neyer
questioned the means to reach further integration, flot the process nor the
costs each country would incur. The existence of the EU was, in itself, a
good thing, and had to be promoted without any doubts.
This had begun to change since reunification, wrote The
Economist. The Germans had just then regained full sovereignty, and so
could only then understand what they would have to sacrifice for the
133
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European cause. Moreover, because the costs of reunification proved to be
far heavier than they had anticipated, European integration was perceived by
the Germans as an extra cost on an already heavily burdened economy. The
Economist maintained that Gennany, for the first time since reunification,
was begiiming to doubt the speed at which the integration process was
taking place. It was no longer the same country that it used to be, and The
Economist, in a rather sombre tone, wamed its readers that whule Germany
was unlikely to stray from the European model, it was becorning a tougher
partner to work with. The reason: Genriany was “slowly waking up to the
fact that it has more options than it used to.”35
As The Economist surveyed Gerrnany’s place in Europe, it
continued to explain why Gerrnany had changed, and why the EU, in the
way envisaged by Cold War federalists, could no longer ring tnie in this
period where Europe spaimed an area from Ireland to the Urals. Tue
Economist maintained that it was France and not Gerrnany that had gained
the most from the EC during the Cold War period. However now that the
Cold War was over, the franco-German alliance, though stili important, had
shifted gears. Germany was no longer squeezed between an Atiantic alliance
dominated by the United States and a powerful Soviet Union, explained The
Economist. Germany acquired 17 million new citizens, with the countries on
its Eastern border looking to it for trade and investment. Germany had, in
Ibidem., p. 59.
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short, become a country preoccupied with many new challenges,
such as
immigration, aid to the East and nuclear safety.’36
Moreover, The Economist explained, it was no longer a matter of
binding Gerrnany more deepÏy into the EU for fear that it would be lured
toward the East, as it had been at the time of unification. At this stage, no
matter which way the EU evolved, whether by integrating more deeply or
expanding towards the East, Germany would have to “look in both
directions”37, as well as sort out its own affairs. It was no longer a country
that had to fuÏfihl its national interests in an international forum, pointed out
The Economist, warning that the EU would have more and more troubl
e
convincing Genriany to continue doing so. Because the face of Europe had
changed, claimed The Econornist, Germany had no choice but to open its
doors to its eastem borders, and far more than any other country in the
EU.’38
The best option for Europe then, continued The Economist, was
to widen the EU but in a way different than the guidelines set by the
Maastricht Treaty. The cornmunity should become, it explained, “a Europe à
la carte”, in which different members could choose to join some policies
and flot others. This would make the EU a more viable enterprise, more than
a ftee-trade zone, but with less a;nbitious federal policies in areas such as
36
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agriculture or regional spending. According to The Econornist, “in
the place
of the old federal illusions must be put the realities of the new, p
ost-Cold
War Europe.”139
It is obvious that by 1993 The Economist viewed this post-Cold
War era with more certainty than between 1989 and 1991, and even in 1992.
It now saw the EU as a reasonable endeavour, perhaps even wort
h
integrating politically, though at different speeds and neyer aiming fo
r
anything resembling a federation. At the same time, it saw Germany as
a
more stable and certainly more secure country, and was no longer as quic
k
to criticise. For example, while the Maastricht Treaty was being ratified an
d
discussed, Germany was undergoing some severe strains, mostly of a
n
econornic nature. This lcd Edmund Stoiber, premier of Bavaria and region
al
chief of the right-centre Christian Social Union, to speak out rather strong
ly
against Geniiany’s commitment to European integration, creating tu
rmoil
throughout the EU.’4° Yet The Econoinist was quick to show the backi
asli
from other German politicians and indeed, took a balanced approach to
this
comment. Instead, it analysed this phenomenon from a different angle
and
put Germany’s place in Europe in a new light.
The Economist explained that whule most of the EU members had
discussed the pros and cons of further European integration, this had neye
r
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been the case in Germany. Before Gemian unification, European
unity was
“universally accepted as the best way of overcoming Germany’s pas
t and
securing a prosperous and peaceful future.”14’ Since its unification, Ge
rman
poÏiticians had been at pains to reassure themselves and their allies that
Genuany would stay secured in the West, and that this new and enlar
ged
version of West Gerrnany would be no fourth Reich. Germany, itsel
f,
pleaded to be more tightly bound, maintained The Economist, sornetimes too
insistently, showing that Genuans thernselves were worried of their new
position in Europe. Thus, no debate existed at home as to the future of the
Deutschrnark, nor about the European economic and monetary union to
which Gerrnany was uncritically committed.’42
That, The Economist argued, was a mistake. Germans shouÏd
have a right to wony about their “beloved” cunency as much as anyon
e
cisc. Otherwise, as things stood, littie internai debate existed concerning th
e
Maastricht Treaty or Germany’s position in Europe, but Germans w
ere
nonetheless faced with recession, with uneasy relations between Eastern an
d
Western Germany, and with burdensome costs of unification that had lcd to
the risc of the far right. At the same tirne, Germany was also providing
aid
to Russia and other Eastern European countries that had asked for financi
al
aid, first to buy off doubts about unification, then in hopes of financin
g
stability in the new democracies to the East. It would onÏy be a matter of
‘ Ibidem
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time, The Econoinist explained, before the Germans began to ask questions
about funding in the East, the rush to European unity, and their
commitrnents to the Union. While this thought may be unsettiing for some,
wrote The Econornist, it should flot be taken in a negative light. Germany
was “not about to reinvent itself in disturbing new guise nor [was] it likely
to stray too far from familiar landmarks.”43 On the contrary, continued The
Econornist, for ail its problems, Germany was riow more at peace with itself
than at any other time during the 2Oth Century. Despite the collapse of the
countries to the East, Germany had no outstanding daims on them, nor did
they hoÏd anything back on Gennany. Russia did not tempt Gerrnany, but
wonied it, and Germany preferred not to deal with this worry alone, but
together with its allies.144
Most important, continued The Eeonomist, was the fact that
Gennany had remained remarkably stable throughout this process of
unification, recession, and the upsurge of racisrn on the political fringes.
And whule the challenges were flot yet over, wrote The Economist, the
question for Germany was flot “whether it will emerge from its coming year
of trial-by-election stifl a democracy, but how a democratic Gerrnany should
use its power and influence in the world.”
145 This would be an appropriate
subject for debate, not only in Germany, but throughout the EU, The
Econornist concluded.
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The Economist maintained that any questions that Germans may
have about European integration and the speed at which it progresses did not
necessarily put integration itself in doubt. Germans were entitled to their
worries, but they were strongly aware of the importance of the EU to them,
if flot aiways politically, then certainly economically, for one third of
Gerrnany’s GDP was provided by the trade and fiee rnarkets within the
EU. 146
Yet while The Econornist asserted that Germany was no longer a
threat, that it was completely entitled to its own opinion with regard to
integration, and that it was one of the rnost important players in the EU, it
did hold several doubts as to Germany’s ability to push forward a deeper
European integration. In examining Gerrnany’s European policy, The
Economist found that there existed too many inconsistencies with regard to
Europe. Firstly, Genriany’s three strands of European poÏicy- opening the
union to the new democracies in the East, pushing toward deeper economic
and rnonetary co-operation, and making the European decision-making
process more open and democratic- would, according to The Economist,
pose increasingly hard choices)47
46 Ibidem
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The Economist continued to maintain that Europe could only
function if it worked at different speeds, a tenu coined as “va
riable
geornetry” in the Maastricht Treaty. But how, asked Tue Economist, co
uld
the European ParÏiament be dernocratic if its policies were not irnplernented
by ail the countries from which its members had been elected? How could a
wider Europe function if there was no radical reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy? The Economist accused the Geniian government of
avoiding these difficuit decisions and of being particularly slow to address
these problems. Until Gerrnany understood where it stood on these issues,
continued The Economis!, it would flot be able to play a leading role in
Europe. Thus, Germany had to understand itself and its position before it
irnposed its opinion on the rest of Europe. The Economist concluded: “for
sorne tirne to corne, Germany will be looking inward, not leading
Europe.”148
VI. Enlarging the Union
While The Econornist urged that Gennany focus on its own issues
with regard to the EU before pushing any specific policy, The Economi
st
periodically wrote articles conceming the EU explaining that enlargement
had to take place. Already in 1993 it wrote that the widening of the EU
could not wait, and should include not just Austria, f inland and Norway, but
also East Europeans such as PoÏes, Czechs and Hungarians, as soon as they
14g Ibidem
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qualified. “The benefits, to new and existing members alike, of a bro
ader
Comrnunity far outweigh the costs.”49 Enlargement was viewed, by The
Economist, as a crucial factor if the European proj ect was to remain a valid
enterprise.
In the eyes of Tue Economist, the EU existed with the main
purpose of sustaining a combination of prosperity and security in Europe
that “[was] arguably without rival on such a scale anywhere in the world.”50
The Econoinist firrnly believed that the EU should ignore the notion of first
deepening the EU. “Widening cannot wait”, it kept repeating’51. For The
Economist, the reason was simple: security. The Econornist believed that if
the Central and Eastem European countries failed to prosper, their new
founded dernocracies would be imperilled. And if the current Union was not
ready to accept more members, it shouid either reform radically, or scrap the
poÏicies that could not in any way accommodate more members, sucli as the
Common Agricultural Policy.
It is interesting to note that it was during Gerrnany’s EU
presidency in 1994 that The Economist urged most the widening of the EU.
It argued that no members were “as enthusiastic about admitting easterners
to the club as the Gerrnans.”52 Central and Eastem European countries
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would surely survive their cuirent slumps, regardless of wheth
er they would
be accepted by the EU, wrote The Economist. Yet, if they do
go through a
turbulent interim, Western Europe too, would suffer. Moreover
, Western
Europe needed its 170 million eastern neighbours as trading
partners,
claimed Tue Economist as it continued to enumerate the reasons for w
hich is
saw the enlargernent of the EU as desirable.
The Economist also pointed out that at that time the Central and
Eastern European countries shared most of the same values and princ
iples as
the West, and they should therefore be treated as equals.153 It was quit
e plain
that The Economist was a strong promoter of an expanded EU,
and it
reitcrated in several articles that Gennany’s presidency was a bles
sing for
the EU, as expanding the Union should happen sooner than later. G
ermany
was the only country which, according to The Econornist, could e
nsure that
enlargernent take place, and soon.
Thus, on this scale too, The Econornist’s view of Gemiany wa
s
palpably different than in the period irnmediately following the
unification
of Germany. It saw Germany as a stable country, as the ens
uing sentence
well shows: “Post-war Gernian governments have tended, lik
e German
bread, to show the same dependable characteristics: a firrn build, a
resilient
texture, and a tremendously long life.”154 Germany was now see
n as a
153 Ibidem
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country which should promote what the Economist valued as
important for
the EU, and it was the country with the most potential to assure
stability and
peace in Europe. Quite a difference, one must admit, to what The Econornist
was writing only four years earlier. It is impossible, however, to dis
cuss The
Economist’s vision of Germany’s role in Europe without enter
ing the
domain of European sedurity, certainly flot as the 1 990s progressed and
the
question of German’s military role within Europe came to the fore. Thu
s, in
the following chapter, flot only will the perception of Germany in Euro
pe be
studied, but also the military role which The Econoinist expected Germa
ny
to play.
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2. The Second Stage: 1995 to 1999
I. Germany Benign
For The Economist, the EU was a large, extremely diverse entity,
divided among many geographical, political, economical and social unes.
An area so divided that those promoting the creation of any sort of federal
union were under the false impression that the European territory could be
united as a single national entity. The Econornist explained that most
European countries, sucli as France and Britain, often acted as proud nation
states within the EU. Germany, on the other hand, was “eager to sit under a
supranational umbrella.”55 The Economist accused Germany of being too
federalist. It quoted the Genrian Christian Democrats, who, according The
Economist, ridiculously “want the [European] commission to be a quasi
government.”56
Tue Economist said that at least for the time being, regardless of
what the Germans thought, the EU should avoid jumping ahead to topics
such as foreign policy, justice and home affairs. Instead, the EU should
focus on delivering a single rnarket, a single currency, and an economically
sound social policy as it had promised, and had not yet fulfilled. It pointed
out that dreams of a federal union were unreal, with the EU barely able to
155
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maintain unity arnong its current fifleen members. Given its eventual
enlargement, the EU should centre on important reforms instead of
fttrthering talks on integration, asserted The Economist.
157
Yet why did The Econoinist keep mentioning Germany when it
spoke of the EU? After exarnining over twenty articles covering the EU, the
answer became quite obvious. Germany was seen as a continuously moving
actor in the EU. In one article from April 1995, for example, The Economist
wrote that “the European Parliament twas] the Germans’ main instrument
for dernocratizing the EU.”58 Germany here was seen as a positive and
democratic force within the EU. In this article, there were no inhibitions
concerning Gennany’ s European role, and in no way alluded to was the idea
that the EU rnight be Gennany’s ‘Trojan horse’, as was the case in the early
1990s.
In another article, however, The Economist focused less on
Germany’s “democratizing” role in Europe, and more on its use ofthe EU to
fulfihi its own interests.159 As The Economist surveyed Gennany’s foreigu
policy, it noted Gennany’s ‘zealous’ dedication to Russia, bringing as an
example Kohl’s numerous visits- far more than any other world leader - to
Yeltsin during his re-election campaign. This was understood as part of
Germany’s attempts to keep stabiÏity in Central Europe. What was striking
157 lbtdein
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to The Economist was that Germany pushed an active Russia
n policy
without “crouching behind the EU”160. In other words, Gerrnany was
not
hesitant of pushing its interests and was not worried about offending any EU
member. The Econornist argued that this was a new phenomenon. Although
it had been predicted that after unification Germany would shift its attention
eastward, The Econoinist added that:
“[This] puts a fresh siant on Germany’s familiar habit of expressing its
own national interests as European interests. That habit is consistent
with its ambition to give Europe a common foreign policy, and to cloak
the Germanness of interests that Germany wants to pursue.”16’
Thus, the moderation that The Economist espoused with regard to
Gerrnany in the mid-90s did flot mean that The Economist ceased to keep
note of Germany’s influence in Europe. In January 1996 an article
conceming Gerrnany’s place in Europe spoke of Germany’s new politica
l
weight in Europe and its entry on both the political and military scene as
neyer before since the end of the Second World War.
162 Interestingly, the
first sentence in the article was a quote from none other than Helmut
Schmidt, ex-chancellor of Germany, who proclaimed that “Germany [was]
making itself unloved around Europe again.”163 The reason, according to
1GO Ibidem
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The Economist, was that “Germany {was] at last growing comfortable with
the idea ofmatching economic might with political muscle.”64
The Economist noted that for ail its muscle, German interests stiil
had lirnits. Unlike the other dominant EU countries, notably France and
Britain, Germany had “no Commonwealth and no Africa to fend for”. Thus,
the difference between Gerrnany and its European partners was that
Gennany “really does believe its interests are identical with Europe’s.
Britain and France for their part can stili pursue their national interests- and
cail them by their narne.”165 The Economist concluded by quoting Mr.
Lamers, active in designing Kohl’s foreign policy: “If Gerrnany tried doing
that [pursuing obviously national interests] we would have heu to pay”66.
The Econoinist ended by saying that Germany was stiil wary of its muscle,
but less so than previously.’67
The Econornist tried, throughout 1996, to define what was meant
by German dominance. In one particular survey called “Too Big for its
Boots?” The Econontist compared Gerrnany with the rest of EU countries. It
explained that while Germany occupied “centre stage” in Europe, it was flot
the EU’s largest country, taking up 11% of land mass in comparison to
64 Ibidem
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france’s y7%168 Then again, wrote The Economist, its population
compensated for this lack, comprising 22% of the EU total population, in
comparison to France and Britain with 16% each. The Economist continued
by comparing Germany’s share in the EU’s GDP in the previous year (28%)
to france’s (18%), Britain’s and ItaÏy’s (both at 13%). It pointed out that
Germany’s comprised over 10% of world exports, more than twice that of
any other EU country. And Germany’s Deutschmark, at least before euro
became active, was the world’s second most important reserve currency
after the dollar.169
Having outlined these facts that clearly showed Germany’s
dominance in Europe, The Economist tried to see what Gerrnany now
represented for Europe. It argued that reunification had not made Germany a
wealthier country, at least not per capita. Moreover, the economic burden of
reunification meant that even Germany might flot fit the Maastricht criteria
for membership of the European monetary union. Militarily, Germany’s
arrny was smaller than that ofFrance’s, and only sliglitly larger than Italy’s.
Moreover, Gerrnany had committed itself to permanentÏy maintain its ban
on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Another source of anxiety to
many notable European leaders and thinkers- Germany’s borders- had
finally been put to rest, and Germany, for the first time in history, accepted
the finality of Poland’s borders. And since Germany did flot have any
68
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“destabilising minorities abroad” and was making “no territorial daims”,
there really was less reason to worry about Germany)7°
Moreover, The Economist continued, Germany was also tightly
bound to a plethora of organisations, ranging from the EU and NATO, to the
World Trade Organisation and the Group of Seven. Tue Econoinist
reiterated that even if Gerrnany was Europe’s biggest and richest country, it
couÏd not function without the EU, so strong were its investrnents
intertwined with other EU countries, most obviously with France.171
Certainly Germany was no longer the dutiful and compliant
country that it had been before its reunification, reasoned The Economist. It
was now reassessing its contributions to the EU budget and its people was
less than enthusiastic about dropping its Deutschmark, but Germany’s
political class remained wholly devoted to the European enterprise, leaving
no doubt that it wished to press forward with European integration and
enlargernent. Moreover, Germany was sure to want to have a successful and
srnooth expansion to the East, for if anything went wrong, the Germans
would be “first in une to clear up the mess.”172
As for foreign policy, The Economist wrote that Germany had
been too over-enthusiastic, and markedly less successful, certainly with
p. 21.
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regard to ex-YugosÏavia. By pushing the EU into recognizing Croatia and
Siovenia, Germany de facto propelled the ex-Yugoslavian conflict,
something which many Europeans saw as reason to wony that Gerrnany
might 5e less dependable than it claimed. Then again, wrote The Economist,
Germany had barely to do anything to arouse suspicion. For no matter how
stable Gerrnany rnight 5e, suspicion remained in the air. The Econoinist
concluded: “However normal Gerrnany may have become, its abnormal past
stili follows it around.”73
The Econornist adrnitted that Germany was flot yet completely
tnisted in Europe, despite ail the reasons detailed above. The Economist feit
that regardless of Germany’s past, its econornic and increasingly political
might sirnply take up too large a place in Europe for anyone to be
completely cornfortable with it.
II. The European Question
According to The Economist, Germany’s predominant rote in
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) may have been a “mere
coincidence” but it nonetheless made several members of the EU
uncomfortable. One important reason for this was the Solidarity Pact (which
penalized any country which did not meet the EMU requirements), strongly
promoted by Gerrnany, that had angered many EU members. But more than
173 Ibtctem
86
just being a financial threat, Gennany was gaining political momentum.
This particularly worried France, which had, to date, been dom
inating the
political sphere while Germany dominated the economic sphere.174
But
France couldn’t expect things to rernain static, wrote The Economi
st, for
Germany had changed. It pointed out that Gerrnany voted to deploy sold
iers
to Croatia, something it did flot choose to do in Bosnia and Herzegovin
a or
the Guif War, and this, without protest arnong Germans and peace-mi
nded
political parties such as the Gieens. What was more, this increasingly active
German involvement in Europe had boosted German confidence. Gerrna
ny
now figured that it could pusli for a federalist Europe while simultaneou
sÏy
wishing to expand to the East, opined The Economist, and reiterated several
tirnes that Eastern enlargernent was mostly in German favour. This n
ew
Euro-area would act as a buffer zone between Russia and Gerrnany
and
would allow Germany ample resurgent markets to conquer and eventual
Ïy
dorninate. 175
The Econonzist saw Germany’s excuse for simultaneous
integration and enlargement as largely exaggerated, Gennany’s reason bein
g
that this would be the best way to prevent another inter-European war. Th
e
Econornist saw this as a pretext for Gemiany to push its own interests wi
thin
the EU, and one that Gennany was especially able to use. Paranoia abo
ut
Germany’s up and coming role in Europe was outdated, claimed The
174
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Econornist, as it pointed to Le Monde’s article, published that we
ek that
said: “Gennans will soon be talking of Hitler as the French talk
of
Napoleon.”176 This argument liad no validity, clairned The Economist.
Although Germany was certainly gaining strength in Europe, there wa
s
nothing to indicate a resurgence of previous behaviour.
Tliougli it wrote tliat “Gerrnany lias gone from economic
prominence to European dominance”177, The Economist no longer appeared
to view Germany’s predominant role in Europe negatively. It wrote that
Kohl’s European poÏicy needed to be better understood. Kohl’s decisions for
deeper European integration at the beginning of the decade were unfounded,
though understandable, considering Kohi liad to appease the Western
powers in the years following reunification. But he should have taken
economic considerations into account when he both accelerated the
reunification of Germany and opted for a single currency under Maastricht,
argued The Econoinist, instead of leading his country with an unbaÏanced
and often incoherent European policy. Moreover, The Economist continued
,
if Gennany insisted on pushing forward its European policy, it should also
participate actively in European foreign policy. It criticized Kohl’s decisio
n
not to participate militarily in the earÏy 1 990s in ex-Yugoslavia, and insisted
76 Ibidem
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that it was time Germany accepted the idea of a legitimate and democr
atic
use ofmilitary interventions.178
This point of Gernian participating in military operations was
raised in the early 1990s, but with quite a bit ofreticence, and quite rarely at
that. Quite differently, in an article from January 1996 The Economist wrote
a rather surprising sentence: “United Gerrnany is starting to feel its muscle.
That is mostly to be welcomed.”79 Five years earÏier certainÏy no one couÏd
have predicted such a sentiment. This sentence alone shows a radical change
in The Economist’s vision of Gerrnany during the course ofthe 1990s. The
Economist continued to push for the need for Germans to fight side by side
with NATO troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina instead ofjust handing over
“calming words and cash”. The Economist argued that the post-1945
pacifism should no longer preclude military interventions, as it had for over
forty years, but should instead be refashioned into a model of using military
force for democratic ends’80.
At the sanie time, The Econoinist believed that Germany’s
position within the EU should be seen in a positive light. A weightier
Gerrnany in the EU, wrote The Economist, was “further assurance that it
will rernain an open, free-trading place, rather than the closed, protectioni
st
178 Ibidem
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club that some members rnight prefer.”81 ClearÏy, The Economist no lon
ger
held the same inhibitions with regard to Gerrnany. It did not s
ee German
power as a breaking force in Europe, but on the contrary,
it feit that
Germany was more likeÏy to ensure peace, democracy and economic
stability on the continent.
The Econoinist was nonetheless critical of Kohl’s European
policies. The Economist said that Kohi saw the EU in too simplis
tic a
manner: either a “full union in Europe or bust-up.”182 The Econ
omist
explained its opinion: the EU had certainly proved to be a succes
sful
institution- who could compare the last fifiy years in Europe with the f
irst
“abysmal” fifty?- but that did not mean that endowing this union
with
federal institutions would make it any more a success. More
over,
Germany’s argument- that a federal Europe would “necessarily solv
e the
problem of coping with a powerful Gennany”- was unfounded. Ger
rnany
would be as strong inside a European federation as without it, wrote
The
Economist. Moreover, monetary union was seen positively even by E
ngland
and Denmark, who had opted out of monetary union but who we
re fully
committed to the single market. This proved to The Economist tha
t the
economic aspect of the union was certainly worthwhile and durable, an
d that
81 Ibidem
82 Ibidem
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Germany need not woy about meeting deadlines and rushing toward
a
quicker union for fear that the project would fali apart.’83
The Economist beÏieved that Germany did not quite grasp the
intricacies involved in rushing toward any kind of union. It explained:
“By insisting on a toughened EMU and a future federal union,
Germany risks a more fundamental fracturing- this time with france,
whose partnership with Germany has been the rock on which European
solidarity has been built. What is more, by driving harder and faster
towards a much tighter union, Germany also risks making the going for
those East Europeans who seek full EU membership tougher and
siower. Yet enlargement to the east, to take in the new dernocracies of
Eastem Europe, is a surer way of protecting Europe’s peace than either
a single currency or Mr Kohl’s federation. Europe stiil has a lot of
unifying to do. Mr Kohi daims he wants both a tighter union and a
bigger one. But by pushing too hard for the first he may end up with
neither. Then, lie would suffer the fate of Bismarck, who saw the
efforts ofa lifetime tumed to ashes.”84
The Economist thus concluded that Kohl’s European drive was
hurting the EU, flot making it stronger. The Econoinist stood by its opinion
that enlargement was the best solution and that a federal union wouÏd only
hinder the process of achieving real stability in Europe.
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By rnid-1997, the difficulties of enlargement see
med
overwhelrning to most members of the EU. The Econoinist, how
ever, quite
in agreement with Britain’s officiai foreign policy of the tirn
e, remained
finrL in its belief that enlarging the EU should rernain the
EU’s top
priority.185 It did flot, moreover, mention any advantages that Gerrnan
y, or
any other country, rnight yield from such an enlargement, but rathe
r viewed
it as something that would be beneficial to ail of Europe.
In early 199$, The Economist tried to understand why it was that
France and Gerrnany were so pro-EU, whereas Britain was a relu
ctant
participant. The Economist reasoned that the EU clearly catered t
o the
national advantage of both france and Germany, and brought the Ge
rman
case to point. “The Germans, for example, press hard for eniargemen
t of the
EU to include the countries of Eastern Europe, a natural hinterla
nd for
German industry.. •,
,186 Thus, The Economist, in this particular article,
contïnued to see European enlargement to Germany’s advant
age. The
Econoinist quoted Nicolas Ridley, a close ally of Margaret Thatcher,
though
it did not say that it agrced with his opinion, that the EU is “ail a Ge
rrnan
racket”, designed to enstire German dominance of Europe.”87 It is
hard to
gauge that this article is representative of The Economist ‘s view of Ger
many
in the late 1990s, yet The Economist did not negate this opinion. On ano
ther
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note, it is certainÏy interesting to see that as late as 1997 suspicious voices
with regard to Germany’s ambitions in Europe could stiil be he
ard.
Yet, most articles from 199$ onward that mentioned Germany’s
role in Europe nonnally did so in the context of discussing the fut
ure of the
EU. That was clearly what concerned The Economist, who did flot m
ince its
words when criticizing EU policies. For example, The Economist co
ntinued
to support European enlargernent, and found that the EU had done
too little
to open its doors to its Eastern neighbours. It had, argued The Eco
nornist,
taken an “inexcusably long time to send out the invitations”.188
In an article from November 1998, The Econornist wrote that
despite the rnany losses that the EU would incur in enlarging the U
nion, it
wouÏd definitely stand more to gain. If EU members did flot admit to this
fact, they “[riskedj undermining both their broader interests and the
reforming efforts of the would-be members thernseÏves.”189 If strong
countries, such as France and Germany, became stuck on their ow
n petty
refoniis, continued The Economist, and were not willing to give th
ese up for
the greater cause, then the whole European project would be at stake. The
Econornist believed that many of these staïling policies of
European
integration should 5e removed. For example, if the cost of enlar
gement
included dismantiing the Common Agricultural Policy, a policy
which had
18$
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being widely discussed during the 1997 Intergovernrnental Conference,
and
one that had kept both France ami Germany preoccupied and less focused o
n
enlargement, ail the better. For The Economist, the $48 billion enterprise
promoted by the Common Agricultural Policy was sirnply an unnecessary
“cushion for West European farmers.”19°
Thus, in 1998 ]7ie Economist continued to opine that European
enlargement wouÏd be beneficial to Europe, but it specified that it was an
enlargement of an econornic nature that interested it most. Indeed, The
Econornist explained, it was economic union, flot political or military ones,
which had brought success and security to the European enlargement
process since the EC’s inception. It brought as an example the once-
marginal Mediterranean countries, which, by being incïuded into the EU,
were brought “securely into the West European fold.” This is exactly what
The Economist beÏieved should be done with Central and Eastem Europe.
Thus, in 1998, the year that yet another European treaty was put to the vote
across Europe, the Amsterdam Treaty, The Econornist wrote rather openly
about where it stood on European issues:
• . The Economist [is among those who] welcorne the econornic
benefits of a well-designed rnonetary union, who deplore the EU’s
dash for Western integration when it should be dashing for Eastem
widening, and who fear that the Union may yet corne a cropper by
getting too far ahead of public opinion -witness the worrying risc ofthe
190 Ibidem., p. 18.
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right in France and Germany... any further political integration should
be limited to increasing democratic legitimacy and
accountability.
As far as a common foreign policy was concerned, The
Economist believed that it was an idea that could one day gain mornentum,
most certainly with regard to the East, where the EU would be bordering
what it considered to be ‘unstable’ and ‘shaky’ countries such as Belarus
and the Ukraine. But The Econornist believed that any foreign policy of the
EU should remain simple, as it had been to date, despite its Balkan
failings.’92
In 1999, The Econornist focused often on the issue of a common
European foreign policy, but was more sceptical than before that it would
succeed. One reason for this scepticism was Germany, affinned The
Economist. It pointed out that Gerrnany, which was now more involved in
foreign affairs than ever before since the Second World War, was stili
reluctant to fight a ground war, such as the United States had in Kosovo.
This was the first reason which The Econornist gave in explaining that a
stronger foreign European poÏicy was as of yet unlikely. Secondly, The
Economist found that such a policy would not be representative of
‘‘
“Europe takes flight”, Tue Econontist, May 2 1998, p. 13.
192
“Europe’s Elusive foreign Minister”, The Economist, July 1$ 199$, p. 4$.
95
Europeans in general who did not think, let alone act, as one entity, argued
The Economist. 193
It is interesting that stiil in 1999 Germany continued to take a
central place in The Economist’s coverage ofthe EU. Indeed, The Econornist
viewed Germany as an integral part of the EU, even as late as 1999. It did
flot cover any other EU country as often or in such length, though France
came in a close second. A good example was the June 1999 issue, when the
cover page of The Economist had, in big letters, the titie “Germany $talls,
the Euro FalÏs”, with a picture of an eagle falling rapidly from the sky. This
is significant, for it indicates that The Econornist saw Germany and Europe
as being extrernely intertwined, so much so, that the fali of Germany as
Europe’s leading economy wouÏd bring chaos to the rest ofthe Euro area.
This shows the complete integration of Germany, and certainly of
Germany’s economy, into Europe. The economic downslide of the Euro
area, as a resuit of Germany’s weakening economy, would, according to The
Economist, certainly give Euro-sceptics a chance to gloat, who would
declare that Europe “got what had been coming to it”.194 The Economist
maintained that the strength or weakness of the euro should not be used to
criticise either Gennany or the idea of monetary union. At the sarne tirne,
revived economic growth and job creation would be the onÏy way of
193
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ensuring both German and European long-terni economic success. The
Economist urged Germany toward structural reform of its econorny as the
only way it saw that Germany would be able to achieve the goals described
above. For The Econornist, it was vital that Germany rehabilitate itself in
order to save both Germany and the euro.195
Thus, by the end of 1999, The Econo,nist’s reading of both
Gerrnany and its role in the European project had certainly changed. No
longer perceived as a threat, German economic success was, on the contrary,
much desired, in order to maintain stabiÏity in the EU. Yet The Economist
was not so enthusiastic in domains other than economic, sornething which
was obvious when Berlin becarne capital of Germany and Germany
celebrated its ten years since reunification. Throughout, it seemed that The
Economist was trying to corne to terrns with the country that Gennany had
becorne.
III. Germany in a New Era
Berlin was to becorne once again capital of Germany. For many
years this was the object of discussions and disagreements arnong European
leaders, The Econornist being among those who had opposed the prospect of
Berlin as capital (sec page 54: “Ich bin ein Boimer”). Thus, as the following
195 IbtcÏent., p. 16.
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quote shows, there was quite a difference between what The Econornist said
in 1990 and in 1999:
• .most of the fears about making Berlin Germany’s capital were
misplaced. People who dipped into the past for a scary image- the
Kaiser’s image, chaotic Weimar or Nazi Berlin- were fishing in the
wrong pond. History rarely repeats itself so simply. Berlin is not the
threat it briefly seerned, as a bottomless tax drain or as a magnet that
would pull Germany’s allegiances away from the West and towards
Russia.”96
This was the complete opposite ofwhat The Econoinist had been
writing just a few years earÏier. Certainly its vision of Gerrnany had
changed. More articles were published about Germany that showed a clear
difference between what was being written about Germany in the early
1990s. Foi- example, when Germany’s commemoration ofthe defeat of Nazi
Gerrnany fifty years earlier was covered, The Economist portrayed what it
called Germany’s “return to normalcy”.’97
In this article, called “Almost Normal”, The Economist wrote
that in most extemal ways, Gerrnany was now a normal country, a
comerstone of Europe, no longer divided, even claiming a permanent seat
on the United Nation’s Security Council. It was now an exemplary
democracy, and was finally beginning to give its opinion, “even yell, on
196
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occasion” at other countries198. The Economist pointed out that about two
thirds of the German population was bom after the war, and explained that
the younger generation of Germans saw themselves as “modem Europeans,
not old-fashioned Gerrnans”. 199 described what it saw as Germany’s
uncomfortable predicament in the following article:
“Germany has done more than any other ex-fascist country to face up
to its history. Given the enomity of the Nazis’ crimes, it would be
astonishing if it could put its past entirely behind it. Yet a country that
wrestles with the meaning of the word ‘normal’, as Germany does,
might be said flot to feel so normal inside. A false step, a wrong note,
and commentators and historians swoop. The weekly Die Zeit puts the
dilemma thus: German soldiers must not fight in the Balkans. because
of Auschwitz; yet because of Auschwitz, they must fight to help the
oppressed. The dilemma, it concludes, is unresolvable.... Thoughtful
Germans believe it is not in their country’s grasp to decide if it is
normal. That lies with the collective understanding of other nations; it
is for them to decide.”20°
We see that The Economist was flot critical of Germany, but
rather tried to explain the difficuit situation in whici Gerrnany now found
itself. There is no blame here, certainly none of its previously common
foreboding tone. The Econoinist did not, however, absolve Germany of its
history, and added that it found the inauguration ofthe Reichstag on Hitler’s
birthday distasteful. It strongly suggested that Germans avoid symbols that
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evoke the past201, but insisted that present-day Germany was flot dangerous
to Europe and acknowledged it as an uphoïder ofpeace and democracy.
This viewpoint was confirmed in an article recapitulating the ten
years after the faiT of Comrnunism and how this change had affected Europe.
The Economist looked at Gerrnany first, before any other country, too see
how this country had changed, and portrayed Germany as a sovereign,
united country, “pre-eminent among its neighbours.”202 Once again,
negative or foreboding tones were completely absent from this article. As
far as The Economist’s style of writing went, Germany as a threat was
officiaiiy a thing ofthe past.
Indeed, The Economist assessed Germany as opening up to a new
phase. For the first time since the Second World War, Germany had a
chancellor, Gerhard Schrôder, who was of the post-war generation (he was
bom in 1944) and who ruled out of “once-imperial Berlin, flot from dozy
little Bonn.”203 The Econornist rernarked however, that even though this
could be seen as a time for Germany to “forget history tand thus] become
more difficuit as a partner”,204 it was doubtful that it wouid do so. $chrder
grew up in the poverty that dominated Gennany after the war. That alone,
wrote The Economist, would be a reminder to Schrider of what happens
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when “Germany tries to dorninate or go it alone.”205 Moreover, the readers
were reminded of the reticence ofmany Social Democrats toward serving in
peacekeeping forces such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, showing that
Gerrnany was nowhere near becorning belligerent.
If Schrôder was not as European-minded as his predecessor
(whose Europhilia The Economist had deemed almost excessive at times),
The Economist was not concerned about bis European policies. Even if he
was less verbose about Germany’s historic mission in Europe, The
Economist found that he was keen on open discourse with the Eastem
European countries and, moreover, he had not spoken of contributing less to
the EU (as Kohi had intended, and Thatcher succeeded, in doing). The
Economist therefore concluded on a positive note, denoting that the new
Chancellor could indeed, be good both for Germany and for Europe. 206
For The Econornist, Schrôder had to be fimi in his political stance
on ail European issues. Any ambivalence on his part would be frightening,
wrote The Economist. Germany must be sure of where it’s going:
“govemment mayhem at the heart of Europe’s most powerful economy
would be a worry at any time.”207 Germany’s dominant political role, with
an upcoming presidency of the EU and chairmanship of the G$ meant that
Gemiany had to be clear, consistent, and refonri its economy if needed, to
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stability in Europe.208 The Economist commended Schrider for
succcssfully pushing for the Agenda 2000, a project of reforms for the EU,
and the skilful way in which lie had put pressure on his goveniment to react
quickly to the war in Kosovo.209
The Economist explained that Germans no longer perceived
themselves as before. It argued that one important reason for Schrôder’s
capacity to convince Germans to go to war in Kosovo was because lie,
defence mini ster Rudoif Scharping and foreign minister Joshka Fischer were
of the “1968 generation”. The Econornist considered these three to be
“converts” for they were now persuading their countrymen to fight for the
first time since the Second World War. The Economist kept underlining the
difference in this new une of leaders as their being younger, energetic, and
in no way associated with the fighting ofthe Second World War.21°
The war in Kosovo, combined with the rise of the Social
Democrat and Green parties, were two important factors which allowed
Germany a “long-denied role in the world,” wrote The Economist.21’ The
Economist was very supportive of Germany’s decision to send soldiers to
fight abroad, and, what is more, found itself congratulating Germany on its
208 Ibidem
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new foreign poticy, since only several years earlier, Germany had refused to
deploy soldiers in international non-combat peacekeeping missions.2 2
The Econo,nist’s optimism was curtailed however, several
months later in mid-1999, when Genriany insisted that the Kosovo crisis
was proofthat the EU needed to have a common foreign and security policy.
It wrote that Germany had been too demanding in its insistence to play a
chief role in formulating such a policy. The Economist rernarked that
Germany had been pushing far too mucli, within the European structure, for
Germans to play leading rotes in the Baikans and within Europe in general.
It brought as examples Germany’s choice of two commissioners to preside
in Brussels and its recent boycott of several EU meetings because the new
Finish presidency refused to include German as a working language.213
Ail this did not bode well for Gerniany, wrote The Econoinist.
While The Econornist did flot openly criticize Germany’s foreign policy, it
pointed out the many ways in which Germany had become an increasingly
resolute force in Europe. In its concluding paragraph, The Economist asked:
“Is there a danger that Gennans may now be forgetting the grimrnest aspects
of their past?” This loaded question was somewhat curbed by a following
sentence, which recalled that the German govemment had recently agreed to
build an impressive memorial to Jewish victims of the Hoïocaust in the
‘12 Ibidem.
213 Ibidem., p. 44.
103
centre of Berlin. But this was flot enough for The Econornist, which did not
immediately dismiss this new German behaviour. It wrote that while
Germany was flot tuming its back on the past, “it [was] less disposed to be
constrained by it.”214 Despite The Econoinist’s approval of seeing German
participation in peacekeeping missions and in holding the EU to certain
reforms, it was not yet completely comfortable with the new role that
Germany was playing. It quoted Schrôder, who said, upon taking office, that
Germany was a country neither “better nor worse” than other countries. The
Economist’s retort: “Quite so. Just a bit bigger than its neighbours, and bang
in the centre of Europe.”215
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3. Conclusion
Gennany’s place in Europe was strongly shaken following its
reunification and the end of the Cold War. No longer a country turned
almost entirely toward the West, it once again became a large
- and central
-
country in Europe. Germany was now faced with countless challenges, one
of its most important ones being to appease its Western European
neighbours while at the same time establishing its relations with the East.
Assuaging Western European worries, especially those of Great Britain and
France, was thus a high priority for Germany. Indeed, Western Europe saw
in Germany a new giant, both economically and geographically, and with a
population largely exceeding those of other Western European countries.
These facts did flot combine well with Germany’s sombre past, and meant
that Germany had to prove to Western Europe that it would rernain the
peace-promoting European integrationist that it had been since the creation
of the European Community.
Thus Germany, torn between calming Western countries and
aiding post-Communist Central and Eastern European countries, tried to
balance two policies, pushing for deeper European integration while
opening its doors toward the East. Many wondered whether Germany would
succeed in reconciling these two policies, in this way reassuring both its
Eastern and Western neighbours of its benign intentions. Germany’s success
at reunification would largely determine the future of the European Union
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with respect to integration and enlargement. Both politicians and media
regarded German reunification and the future of the EU with an
apprehensive eye.
The importance of the printed media in shaping Western
European and North American perceptions of the events occurring on the
Continent can not be underestimated. To see whether or not Germany’s
attempts at placating these worries were successful would only become
obvious if Western media portrayed Germany no longer as a potentially
dangerous force, but as a country like any other. Germany’s path toward
becoming a normal country, and the strnggles and impediments that it had to
overcome, has been analysed in this study.
This dissertation has shed light on Germany’s evolution in
Europe and within the European Union on the basis of Germany’s portrayal
by The Economist. This has allowed us to gauge perceptions of this
evolution in a most influential international weekly.
It has been found that The Economist changed its interest in
Germany quite rnarkedly during the 1990s. It went from writing about
Gennany in virtually every issue from 1989 to 1991, to slowly decreasing its
coverage of Germany and, from 1995, it wrote on this subject no more than
two or three editorials per year. These changing emphases have been
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presented here in the context of scholarly perceptions of Gerrnany and of its
place in the EU.216 Thus, this essay offers joumalistic and scholarly visions
ofGennany’s place in Europe.
The Economist was flot alone in having fears with regard to
Geniiany. Indeed, anxiety about Germany and of a “Europe created in the
image of the German political system”217 was ubiquitous in European
Member States and among intellectuals interested in the German question.
This apprehension was to be expected, according to director of the Institut
fur Europiiische Politik, Mathias Jopp, especially after the initial surprise of
the “re-emergence of a large and united Germany.”218 Arthur Hoffmann,
from the histitute for German Studies at the University of Birmingham,
explained this phenomenon in Germany and European Integration in the
1990s: Continuity or Change?:
“Some analysts have argued that united Germany was
unlikely to depart significantly from the traditional
foreign policy style, while others have claimed that she
was likely to tui-n ber economic strength into an explicit
leadership role based on the pursuit of her national
interests. This, by implication, would mean two things.
First, a shift from her commitment to the ftirther
216 In order to avoid confusion, only the titie EU will be used in this conclusion, regardless of whether the
era rnentioned precedes or follows the Maastricht Treaty.
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dir. Boim, Europa Union Verlag, 2002, p. 10.
218 fbidem
107
deepening ofthe EC with the goal ofa federal structure;
and secondly, a Gerrnany which would be less sensitive
to the interests of ber neighbours. Thus some analysts
even asked: ‘Should Europe fear the Gerrnans?”29
It has transpired that The Economist echoed several mainstream
opinions ofpolitical scientists and historians. What then is special about The
Economist’s viewpoint?
First, the dramatic way in which Germany was portrayed in the
early 1990s, with negative lirnuendos and foreboding tities must have
irnpacted the way Germany was perceived by The Economist’s readers. This
image was, moreover, representative of a certain political and business class
viewpoint in Britain and North America, an audience which, according to
The Econonzist itse1f is composed of “intelligent, Iively, cosmopolitan,
thinking people across the board ... {with] the highest incidence in the world
of movers and shakers among our readership”22° Thus, the image The
Econornist offered of Gennany carried a certain weight.
The internationally minded journal The Economist, unlike several
British leaders, did not over-dramatize the situation, neyer openly criticizing
Germany. It often confronted these Britisli leaders, especially Thatcher,
saying that Gerrnany was certainly not as threatening as Thatcher had
219 Arthur Hoffrnann, Gennany and European Integration in the 1990s: Continuity or change? p. 6.220 Ernail correspondence between Miriam Rabkin and Xan Smiley on April 14, 2003.
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implied. Moreover it suggested that such criticism were doing littie else than
isolating Britain, thus allowing for French and German leaders to pursue
their own integrationist views for Europe. Jndeed, as time passed and united
Germany’s actual activities within the EU did not show radical changes
from its earlier modus operandi, The Economist toned down its anxiety and
offered a vision ofhow the EU should progress.
This transition for Germany - one which historians saw as a
transition from a ‘subject’ to an ‘actor’ in European politics - did not
necessarily reflect a fiindarnental change in German behaviour.22’ Moreover,
partÏy because of Germany’s newly acquired strength as a European
“superpower”, partly because of its decreased dependence on the United
States, it became expected of it to play a much more significant role in both
the integration and enlargement of the EU.222 This sarne transition can be
seen in The Economist’s writings, as it too, began to expect Germany to
open up to enlargement, while criticizing further steps toward deeper
integration.
The Economist’s view of the EU also altered over the years.
Though in general viewing the EU as “broadly speaking, a good thing,”223
as this essay has shown, The Economist generally abstained from pushing
for a doser political union. According to its editor, The Economist is “wary
221 Cloutier, op.cit., p. 10$.
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of too tiglit a political union before the peoples of Europe are ready for it or
have a tnily common identity,” preferring instead a “looser arrangement
than the keener federalists want.”224 He explains that for The Econornist, it is
important that national identities be respected and “national govemments be
the main drivers of political life.”225 He confirms our conclusion that The
Econoinist views economic union favorably - “we are very keen on the
common market” — and adds rather frankly that The Econoinist is “less keen
on ‘ever doser’ political union.”226 Tite Economist views enlargement as
“part of a widening but loose grouping of countries and believes strongly
that the former Communist countries should be welcorned back into the
heart of Europe.”227
Germany’s post-reunification role in Europe demonstrated its
commitment to the West. in addition, Germany had hoped that its active
participation in “important European events such as Maastricht, Amsterdam,
Monetary Union, the enlargement process arid the country’s concrete
behaviour and policy in these or other cases of European affairs”228 would
counter-act its cumbersome past. Jopp brings Poland as an example of a
country which changed its previously negative image of Germany when it
224 Ibtdem
225 Ibidem
226 Ibidem
227 Ibidem
22$ Jopp, “Perceptions of Germany’s European Policy.
.“ op. lit., p. 11.
110
saw that Germany would be a key player in propelling Poland’s accession
into the EU.229
At first we saw The Economist suspicious of Germany, flot quite
ready to admit that it was a country to be treated as any other. This vision
evolved and The Economist began to relate to Germany’s uncertain
predicament without invoking its grim past. While no longer portraying it as
a threat to Europe, The Economist assessed Germany’s place in Europe,
rarely missing an opportunity to mention Germany’s economic, if flot
political, predominance in Europe. This trend is Ïess pronounced among the
historians and political scientists, reviewed in the first part of this work,
who, whule trying to understand Germany’s role in Europe, ceased to
address the possibility of a future threat in the early 1 990s. Instead we saw
these scholars focus on policy options for Germany intent on convincing its
neighbours of its commitrnent to the European project.
A fundamental change happened around 1995, when The
Econornist began to present Germany as a “normal” country, thougli on
occasion suspicions did appear in its pages. In scholarÏy work however, this
era of Germany’s ‘retum to normalcy’ began almost irnrnediately following
the unification of Gennany.23° Thus, it is only in 1999 that The Econornist
presents Germany as an equal with its EU members, and expects Germany
229 Ibidem
230 Letourneau, op.cit., p. 333.
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to participate in ail peacekeeping missions. Once again, this is concurrent
with what was being written in the year 2000:
• .there lias been the expectation that Gerrnany should
now assume greater responsibilities concomitant with its
new position. Gennany has become the central focus of
integration in Western Europe and is expected to be one of
the principal architects of a new security order.”231
Yet The Economist neyer fails to acknowledge that Gerrnany is
unique within Europe. It admires Germany’s econornic miglit and repeatedly
suggests that Germany’s geographic location places Germany at the centre
of ail things European. Its frequent assertions that the EU is just a tool for
Gerniany to promote its own interests gradualiy disappear. A Germany that
acts solely for its own interests, or strives to become the strongest of ail
European nations, was no longer viewed as a possibility. Germany had
proved itself, to both The Economist and to the scholars, providing “more
institutional actors involved in its European policy-making than most other
states.”232 Jnileed, Gerrnany had succeeded in its goal, for the image of
Gennany no longer carried negative overtones. Far from being a cause for
concem, Germany - as seen by The Econornist — had become a faithftil and
vital European partner.
231 Bluth, p. 1.
22 Hyde-Price, op.cit., p. 32.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Anderson, Jeffrey. Gennan Unification and the Union of Europe.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 227 pages.
Ash, Timothy Garton. In Europe Narne. Germany and the Divided
Continent. New York, Random House, 1993. 680 pages.
Bach, Jonathan P.G. Between foreign Sovereignty ancl Integration. German
foreign Poticy and National Identity after 1989. New York, St. Martin’s
Press, 1999. 226 pages.
Baun, Michael J. A Wider Europe. The Process and Potitics of European
Union Entargement. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
2000. 257 pages.
Banchoff Thornas F. The German ProbÏenz Transformed: Institutions,
Politics, and foreign Policy, 1945-1999. Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 1999. 217 pages.
113
Baring, Amuif. Germany New Position in Europe. ProbÏerns and
Perspectives. Oxford, Berg Publishers, 1994. 134 pages.
Baun, Michael J. A Wider Europe. The Process and Politics of European
Union EnÏctrgement. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.,
2000. ?? pages
Collins, Stephen D., ed. Gennan Foticy-Making and EU Entargement
during the Kohl Era. Managing the Agenda?, Manchester and New York,
Manchester University Press, 2002. 207 pages.
De Bresson, Henri. La nouvelle Allemagne. Paris, Éditions Stock, 2001. 279
pages.
Drevet, Jean-François. L ‘Élargissement de Ï ‘Union européenne, jusqti ‘où?
Paris, UHarmattan, 2001. 353 pages.
Dudley Edwards, Ruth. The Fursuit ofReason: The Economist, 1843-1993.
London! New York .Hamish Hamilton, Penguin Books USA, 1993. 1020
pages.
Hyde-Price, Adrian G.V. Gerinany and the European Order. Enlarging
NATO and the EU. Manchester and New York, Manchester University
114
Press; New York; distributed exclusively by St. Martins Press, 2000. 270
pages.
Jeffery, Charlie and Roland Sturm, ed. Federalisrn, Unification and
European Integration. London; Portiand, OR, Frank Cass, 1993. 181 pages.
Kinsky, ferdinand. L ‘Allemagne et l’Europe. Lausanne, Fondation Jean
Monnet pour l’Europe, Centre de recherches européennes, 1995. 194 pages.
Lippert, Barbara, et.al. British and German Interests in EU Enlargernent.
Conftict aizd Cooperation. LondonfNew York, Continuum, 2001. 127 pages.
Marsh, David. Gernzanv and Europe. The Ci-isis of Unity. London,
Mandarin, 1994. 240 pages.
Martens, Stephan. AtÏemagne. La nouvelle puissance européenne. Paris,
IRIS, 2002. 202 pages.
McCormick, John, The European Union. Folitics anci Policies, 2l edition.
Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1999. 320 pages.
115
McCorrnick, John. Understanding the European Union. A Concise
IntrocÏuction. 2nd edition, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, NewYork,
Palgrave, 2002 [1999]. 237 pages.
Pinder, John. The European Union. A Veîy Short Introduction. Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2001. 203 pages.
Schoenbaurn, David and Elizabeth Pond. The Germaiz Question and other
German Questions. Oxfoi-d/New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1996. 250 pages
(Cou. “St. Anthonys series).
Wood, Stephen. Germany, Europe ctnd the Persistence of Nations.
Transformation, Interests and Identity, 1989-1996. Aldershot, Ashgate
Publishing Ltd, 1998. 381 pages.
Wilson, Frank L. European Potitics Today. The Democratic Experience. 3rd
Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1999 [1990]. 446 pages.
Chapters from Books
Cloutier, Joey, Benoît Lemay and Paul Letoumeau. “Gemian foreign Policy
and International Security”, from Inauspicious Beginnings. Principal
Powers and International Security Institutions after the Cold War. 1989-
116
1999, Onnig Beylerian and Jacques Lévesque, ed. Montreal and Kingston,
Mcgill-Queen’s University Press, 2004. pp. 107-130.
Jopp, Mathias. “Gerrnany and EU Enlargement”, from East-Centrat Europe
and the EU Problems oflntegration, Karl Kaiser and Martin Br(ining, cd.
Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1996. pp. 107- 120.
Jopp, Mathias. “Perceptions of Gerrnany’s European Policy- an
Introduction”, from Germany ‘s European Policy. Perceptions in Key
Partner Countries, Mathias Jopp, Heinrich Schneider, Uwe Schrnalz, ed.
Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 2002. pp. 9- 20.
Miiller, Harald. “Gennan foreign Policy after Unification”, from The New
Gennany and the New Europe, Paul B. Stares, cd. Washington, D.C., The
Brookings Institution, 1992.
Paterson, Williarn E. “The Chancellor and Foreign Policy”, from Adenauer
to KohÏ. The DeveÏopment of the Germait ChanceÏÏorship, Stephen Padgett,
cd. London, Hurst and Cornpany, 1994, pp. 127-156.
Schumacher, Dicter. “Impact on Gemian Trade of Increased Division of
Labour with Eastern Europe”, from Europe ‘s Economy Looks East.
117
Implications for Gerinany ancÏ the European Union, Stanley B. Black, ed.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Schwarz, Hans-Peter. “Germany’s National and European fnterests”, from
Arnuif Baring, ed. Germany’s New Position in Europe. Problems and
Perspectives, Oxford and Providence, Berg, 1994.
Spence, David. “The European Comrnunity and German Unification”, from
federalism, Unfication and Europectn Integration, Charlie Jeffery and
Roland Sturm, ed. London and Portland, OR, Frank Cass, 1993. pp. 136-
163.
Articles
Letourneau, Paul. “La politique étrangère allemande. Style nouveau et
fidélité au multilatéralisme,” Revue d’Allemagne et des Pays de langue
allemande, April-June 1999, vol. 31, number 2, pp. 333- 345.
Tewes, Henning. “Between Deepening and Widening: Role Conflict in
Germany’s Enlargement Policy”, Western European Politics, April 1998,
vol. 21, number 2, pp. 117-133.
118
Jungclaussen, John F. “Liberal bis in die letzte Zeile”, Die Zeit, 26 February
2004, P. 27-28.
The Econornist. Ianuary 1989- Decemberl 999 [inciusiveJ.
On Content Analysis
Danielson, Wayne A. and Dorninic L. Lasorsa, “Perceptions of Social
Change: 100 Years of Front-Page Content in the New York Times and The
Los Angeles Tirnes,” from Cari W. Roberts, cd. Text Analysis for the Social
Sciences: Method for Drawing Statistical Inferences from Texts and
Transcripts. Mahwah, NJ, Lawrence Eribaum Associations, 1997, pages
103-115.
Neuendorf, KirnberÏy. The Content Analysis Guidebook. Thousand Oaks,
California, Sage Publications, 2002. 301 pages.
Web Sites
Die Bundesregierung Deustchland.
http://en.undesrcgicrung.de/frarneset/index.jsp
Economist.Com http://www.economist.com!
Europa. The European Union On-Line. http://europa.eu.int/index en,htm
H9
Email Correspondence
Smiley, Xan. Re: The Economist View. (2003, April 14.). [Email addressed
to Miriam Rabkin] [on-lineJ miri2009(i)yahoo.ca
Smiley, Xan. The Economist View. (2003, April 14.). [Ernail addressed to
Miriam Rabkin] [on-une] rn iri2009(yahoo . c a
Srniley, Xan. The Economist. (2003, April 14.). [Ernail addressed to Miriam
Rabkin] [on-une] miri2009(’à’yahoo.ca
